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PHILIPPINE LABOR LAW-A SURVEY*
PERFECTO FERNANDEZ**
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
There are four basic categories of employer misconduct which the
Industrial Peace Act (hereinafter referred to as the "act") labels as
unfair labor practices. 5 2 The first is a very broad category; it includes
interference, restraint or coercion of employees with respect to their
right to organize.2 53 The other three refer to particular types of
conduct: (1) requiring "yellow dog" contracts; 54 (2) company un-
ionism;255 (3) discriminatory practices affecting employment which
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,"' or
prejudicial acts committed against an employee for having filed charges,
testified, or for being about to testify under the act.257
Interference, coercion, restraint. Complaints of unfair labor prac-
tice have been sustained where fully corroborated testimony showed
that the complaining employee was warned that unless he stopped
union activities, something would happen to him," 8 and where the
employer had threatened a union recruiter with bodily harm if he did
not turn over the affiliation forms used.25 A violation was also found
where the employee was coerced into signing a letter of withdrawal
from the union. 6
While it is the prerogative of the employer to grant his employees
whatever benefits he deems proper, he cannot use economic coercion to
defeat unionization or the selection of a union as bargaining represen-
tative. The prohibition covers promising as well as granting or with-
drawing benefits. Unfair labor practices have been found where the
employee was promised a raise in salary if he did not join the union82
* Continued from Volume 40, Number 2, pp. 234-69.
** Member of the Faculty, College of Law, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
University of The Philippines.
252R.A. No. 875, § 4(a) (1953), as amended, PHim. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 36(a)
(1956).
253 Industrial Peace Act § 4(a) (1) (1953).
254 Industrial Peace Act § 4(a) (2) (1953).
255 Industrial Peace Act § 4(a) (3) (1953).
256 Industrial Peace Act § 4(a) (4) (1953).
257 R.A. No. 875, §§ 4(a) (5) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, §
36(a) (5) (1956).
258 Permanent Concrete Prod. v. Frivaldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-14179 (Sept. 15, 1960).259 Velez v. Watchmen's Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12639 (April 27, 1960).
260 Scoty's Dep't Store v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-8116 (Aug. 25, 1956).
261 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961).
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and where a supervisor recommended that no cash advances be given
to any member of the union. 62 Benefits promised to workers if they
withdraw from the union are a clear violation, 8' as are efforts by a bus
company to dissuade the union from presenting bargaining proposals
by promising that the company will buy buses to accommodate all the
members of the union. 6
Charges of unfair labor practice have been sustained where it was
shown that the chief of the company's security force consistently kept
union officers and employees affiliated with or sympathetic to the
union under surveillance.165 "Questioning of employees concerning
union membership and activities and disparaging remarks by supervi-
sory employees made in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free
choice on the part of the employees, have been uniformly condemned
as a violation of the Act." 68 An unfair labor practice charge was sus-
tained where it was shown that union members were repeatedly ques-
tioned as to the union affiliations of other employees.
26 7
Because the scope of prohibited conduct is broad, a wide range of
employer activity, although not falling in the categories listed above,
may constitute, or be evidence of, unfair labor practices. In cases
where the charges were sustained, the following employer acts were
found to have been committed: issuing stern warnings to an employee
upon his affiliation with a labor union; 28 advising individual employees
not to join the union; 68 demanding that employees disaffiliate from
the union or that they dissolve it; 270 procuring the arrest of union
officers on the pretext that they were causing trouble in the employer's
office and had threatened to harm him;"' telling a union member
that if he desired to go on working with the company, to resign from
the union; 272 telling the unionists that if the union was not dissolved,
the business would be sold278 or closed; 274 branding a legitimate labor
262 Broce & Jimenez v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959).26 Prudnial Bank & Trust Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13401 (Dec. 29, 1960).264Fernando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. 1,17896 (May 30, 1962).
265 NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1944).26 6Scoty's Dep't Store v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-8116 (Aug. 25, 1956) citing
H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 518 (1941) ; Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 132 F2d 390, 392-95 (4th Cir. 1942) ; NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140
F.2d 51, 56 (4th Cir. 1944); Piedmont Shirt Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 738 (4th Cir.
1944).
267 Ibid.
20 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961).
260 SMB v. Santos, Gen. Reg. No. L-12682 (Aug. 31, 1961).270 Cano v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15594 (Oct. 31, 1960).
273lVelez v. Watchmen's Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12639 (April 27, 1960).
22 Ibid.
273 Fernando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962).274Scoty's Dep't Store v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-8116 (Aug. 25, 1956).
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organization as a communist organization and comparing the union
organizer to the convicted chieftain of the Huk Army;275 and promising
favorable action on a petition for reinstatement pending with the
grievance committee.276
Discriminatory conduct. Discriminatory treatment constitutes an
unfair labor practice277 when engaged in to encourage278 or discour-
age279 membership in any labor organization. Discriminatory treat-
ment by way of reprisals against an employee for having filed charges,
given testimony, or for being about to give testimony under the act28
is also an unfair labor practice. The act encompasses all management
prerogatives and functions as possible sources of discriminatory treat-
ment. Undue preference may occur with respect to hiring, tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employment. Thus, the exe-
cution of a closed shop agreement with a union not shown to have the
status of representative of the employees constitutes an unfair labor
practice.28' The protection of the act extends to the relatives of union-
ists on the principle that what is prohibited directly may not be accom-
plished indirectly. The Supreme Court cited Teller to the effect that
"the discharge of relatives of an employee who has himself been dis-
criminately discharged, for no other reason than the relation, is itself
a discriminatory discharge. '28
2
275 Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16992 (Dec. 23, 1961).27 Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Baldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-17739 (Dec. 24, 1964).
277 R.A. No. 875, § 4(a) (4) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, §
36(a) (4) (1956).278 Mindanao Motor Line v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18418 (Nov. 29, 1962); Mon-
cada Bijon Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-8065 (March 30, 1962) ; Cia Maritima v.
United Seamen's Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-9923 (June 20, 1958).
279 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Feb. 26, 1965);
Lopez v. Chronicle Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-20179 & L-20181 (Dec. 28,
1964); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena
Estate, Gen. Reg. No. L-18336 (May 31, 1963) ; Manila Metal Caps & Tin Cans Mfg.
Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17578 (July 31, 1963); Sanchez v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-19000 (July 31, 1963) ; Oceanic Air Prods. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18704 (Jan. 31,
1963); Mindanao Motor Line v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18418 (Nov. 29, 1962); San
Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962) ; Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa ng Alak (NAFLU) v. Mailton Distillery Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18112
(Oct. 30, 1962) ; Columbia Rope Factory v. Tacloban Ass'n of Laborers & Employees,
Gen. Reg. No. L-14848 (Oct. 31, 1962); Plaza v. Mencias, Gen. Reg. No. L-18253
(Oct. 31, 1962); Santiago Rice Mill v. Santiago Labor Union alias Magat Labor
union, Gen. Reg. No. L-18040 (Aug. 31, 1962); NARIC v. NARIC Workers Union,
Gen. Reg. No. L-18058 (Aug. 30, 1962) ; Dy Pac & Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18460(Aug. 24, 1962). For other cases see FERNANDEZ & QUIASON, LAW OF LABOR RELA-TIONS 187-92 (1963).2s Itogon Suyoc Mines Inc. v. Baldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-17739 (Dec. 24, 1964);
National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961) ; Henares v.
NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-17535 (Dec. 28, 1961); PAN-TRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg.
No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).
281 Sta. Cecilia Sawmills, Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-19273 & L-19274 (Feb. 29, 1964).
282 Philippine Am. Cigar & Cigarette Factory Workers v. Philippine Am. Cigar &
Cigarette Mfg. Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18364 (Feb. 28, 1963).
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Anti-union stipulations. The act specifically outlaws so-called "yel-
low dog" contracts. These are employment contracts which carry anti-
union stipulations, usually as follows: a representation by the em-
ployee that he is not a member of any labor union; a promise by the
employee that he will not join any labor union; or that upon joining a
labor union, he will terminate employment. 83
The legal reforms which brought the "yellow dog" contract into vir-
tual desuetude are now features of the Industrial Peace Act. Injunc-
tion is no longer available against the act "of becoming or remaining a
member of any labor organization of any employee organization re-
gardless of any undertaking or promise as is described in section eight
of this Act" (Anti-union promise or 'yellow dog' contract).'" Damage
suits based on the concerted activities of employees are now precluded
by express provisions of the act. 85 Furthermore, the "yellow dog"
contract does not merely constitute an unfair labor practice, it is null
and void. 8" In a case filed with the Court of Industrial Relations
(hereinafter referred to as the "CIR") prior to enactment of the act,
a strike was upheld as valid and justified where it was shown to have
been declared, among other grounds, in protest of a "yellow dog" stip-
ulation. 287
Employer domination. Under prevailing conditions, the incidence of
company unionism in the Philippines is quite high. Records show,
however, that there are few official complaints based on employer
domination of a union, and unfair labor practice suits which have been
sustained on this ground are very rare.288 In one case, it was held that
the CIR finding of an unfair labor practice of employer domination
should be sustained where it clearly appeared "that the Manila Bay
Watchmen Agency was instigated, initiated and organized by peti-
tioner herein for the purpose of frustrating the demands of respondent
union and crippling the same."8 More recently, the Supreme Court
sustained a CIR finding of company domination on a showing of the
following circumstances: (1) the company officers had required vari-
283 R.A. No. 875, § 8 (1953), as amended, PH3L. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 40 (1956).
284 R.A. No. 875, § 9(a) (2) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, §
41(a) (2) (1956).285 R.A. No. 875, § 24, para. 2 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 56,
para. 2 (1956).2 8 8R.A. No. 875, § 8, (1953), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 40 (1956).287 Macleod v. Progressive Fed. of Labor, Gen. Reg. No. L-7887 (May 31, 1955).288 Wurfel, Trade Union Development and Labor Relations Policy in the Philip-
pines, 12 Im. & LAB. REL. REv. 582, 589 (1959) ; Carroll, Philippine Labor Union, 9
PHm. SUDIms No. 222, 245-46 (1961).289 Velez v. Watchmen's Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12639 (April 27, 1960).
19651
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ous employees to sign up with the company union, or be dismissed in
case of refusal; (2) during the union's election of officers, the manager
and the company counsel were present; and (3) employee members of
the rival union were laid off due to a purported retrenchment policy
brought about by losses suffered by the firm, but no member of the
company union was laid off or dismissed. The CIR order of disestab-
lishment was consequently upheld. 9 '
However, the payment of a just and valid claim for overtime com-
pensation, pursuant to a compromise agreement with the employer does
not constitute unlawful support of a particular union."'
Reprisals for filing a case or giving testimony. In order to give ade-
quate protection to the right of self-organization, it is essential to pro-
tect not only the organization process itself, but also, access to judicial
redress must be protected. If any employee were subject to discrimi-
nation for seeking or assisting the enforcement of his rights or those
of his union under the act, the protection which the law confers would
be made futile and a source of peril for the employee in need of it. 22
As a result, unfair labor practice charges have been sustained under
the act where, in conjunction with other employer misconduct, the em-
ployee was dismissed for having testified in an unfair labor practice
case against the company;292 and where dismissals followed the filing
of two cases against a company. 9' To invoke the protection of the act
the filing of the charge or the giving of testimony, whether past or
merely contemplated, must be in connection with the remedies pro-
vided by the act for the protection of the right of self-organization and
other rights guaranteed under section 3P29
Union unfair practices. It has been the experience in many countries
that organizational rights are as much subject to union interference as
to employer interference. Certain types of union conduct are, there-
fore, also prescribed as unfair labor practices.296 This preserves the
balance and completes the protection given by law to the fundamental
right of self-organization.
Two major types of union misconduct are deemed unfair labor prac-
290 Oceanic Air Prods. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18704 (Jan. 31, 1963).
291 PASUMIL Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19628 (April 31, 1964).
2 92 PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).
293 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961) ; Hen-
ares v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-17535 (Dec. 28, 1961).
294 PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 2 1957).
295 Royal Interocean Lines Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-11745 (Oct. 31, 1960).
296R.A. No. 875, § 4(b) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 36(b)
(1956).
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tices under the act. These are restraint or coercion of employees in the
exercise of their fundamental rights under section 3 of the act,"7 and
unlawful discrimination by the employer procured or attempted to be
procured by the union, or discrimination against a particular employee
as to his admission into or separation from the union." 8 However,
allegations that the complaining employees were prevented through
force or intimidation from going to their places of work by officers and
members of a union, do not charge an unfair labor practice cognizable
by the CIR."9 Other unfair labor practices will be taken up in connec-
tion with collective bargaining and internal procedures of labor unions.
Persons liable for unfair labor practices. The employer is liable for
unfair labor practices resulting from his own acts as well as from the
acts of persons for whom he is responsible. Thus, a firm has been held
liable for the misconduct of its security officer on the principle of rati-
fication. °0° A corporation was likewise held liable for the unfair labor
practices of its president and its manager, notwithstanding that only
the latter were impleaded as defendants, where the corporation was
owned by the family of the defendants."°'
However, agents of employers who commit unfair labor practices
are not necessarily personally liable where they acted-within the scope
of their authority and there is no showing of negligence or bad faith on
their part. 02
As a rule, transferees of a business are not liable for the unfair labor
practices of the previous owner, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary.0 However, where the transferee is a mere conduit and
under the control of the original employer, the transferee may be held
liable.30
4
UNFAIR LABOR PRfACTIcE SuiTs
Unfair labor practice proceeding. The following remedies are avail-
able upon the commission of unfair labor practices: (1) an unfair labor
practice proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations; (2) an ordi-
297 R.A. No. 875, § 4(b) (1) (1953), as amended, PHm. AiNr. LAws tit. 42, § 36(b)(1) (1956).
2.. RA. No. 875, § 4(b) (2) (1953), as amended, pRi. AxH. LAws tit. 42, § 36(b)
(2) (1956).
29D Abo v. PHILAME Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-19912 (Jan. 30, 1965).
800 SMB v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12682 (Aug. 31, 1961).
301 Emilio Cano Enterprises v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20502 (Feb. 26, 1965).02 Mindanao Motor Line v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18418 (Nov. 29, 1962).
303 INSUREFCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19247 (May 31, 1963) ; Fernando v.
Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962).
804 PLASLU v. Sy Indong Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18476 (May 30, 1964).
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nary action for damages in the regular courts; and (3) a criminal
action in the regular courts.
The Court of Industrial Relations is vested with jurisdiction to try
unfair labor practice cases and has authority to issue injunctions.
Section 5 of the act states that "the Court shall have jurisdiction over
the prevention of unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. 3. 5
Borrowing on the pronouncements of the United States' federal
courts as to the nature of unfair labor practices, the Supreme Court
has declared that an unfair labor practice is an offense against a public
right or interest and should be prosecuted in the same manner as a
public offense. 05 In the absence of injury to a public interest, that is
to say, in the absence of a finding of unfair labor practice, the court has
no power to give redress, but must dismiss the complaint and leave the
redress of the private rights to the ordinary remedies. 0
Preliminary proceedings. The CIR has no power to act on its own
initiative and initiate unfair labor practice proceedings. A charge is
essential to set judicial machinery in motion. A charge may be made
by an offended party or his representative. It may be filed by an
aggrieved employee, a legitimate labor union, or by an officer or agent
of the latter,"5 or by the aggrieved employer, or his agent.05 The sub-
stance of the charge must be that some "person has engaged or is en-
gaging in any... unfair labor practice."310 The rule on splitting a
single cause of action applies to unfair labor practice proceedings.
Thus, when a labor union accuses an employer of acts of unfair labor
practice allegedly committed during a given period of time, the charges
should include all acts of unfair labor practices committed during that
period. 1'
The act directs that "the Court or any agency or agent designated by
the Court must investigate such charge... As the court is presently
305 R. A. No. 875, § 5 (1953), Pinm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(a) (1956).
306 Jornales v. Central Azucarera de Bais, Gen. Reg. No. L-15287 (Sept. 30, 1963)
and cases cited therein.
307 Baguio Gold Mining Co. v. Tabisola, Gen. Reg. No. L-15265 (April 27, 1962);
National Labor Union v. Insular Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July
31, 1961).
308 NLU v. Dinglasan, Gen. Reg. No. L-7945 (March 23, 1956).
309 E.g., Young Men Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb.
26, 1965).
310 R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(b)
(1956).
321 Dionela v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18334 (Aug. 31, 1963).
312R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, 37(b)
(1956).
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organized, preliminary investigations are conducted by the trial attor-
neys in the Prosecution Division of the CIR. Aside from its central
office at Manila, the Prosecution Division has two branches in the
provinces. One of these handles investigative work in the Cebu and
Iloilo branches of the Court, while the other handles the investigative
work in the Cagayan de Oro and Davao branches of the court."'
The essentiality of a prior investigation before the institution of a
formal complaint for unfair labor practices is well settled. The Su-
preme Court has held that the preliminary investigation of the charge
is a mandatory duty of the court, 1 ' and that the investigation may be
conducted not only by the CIR itself, but through any of its members
or agents.1 5 Thus, where the trial court itself has investigated the
charge, a complaint may issue without preliminary inquiry by the
prosecutor."1 '
Under the act, the respondent is not required to answer the com-
plaint. It is the practice of the CIR, however, that in the notice of
hearing which is served with a copy of the complaint, to include a
written direction that the respondent answer within the period speci-
fied."' In addition, the act confers upon the CIR the power to require
that the respondent appear personally at the hearing."8
Hearing procedure. The informality of the proceedings is evident in
the announcement that "it is the spirit and intention of this Act that
the Court and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure." '319
While the parties are free to hire lawyers to represent them, the act
directs that "in the proceeding before the Court or a Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal
counsel."M20
In unfair labor practice cases, the Court is directed to observe the
procedure prescribed in the act and may not resort to mediation and
conciliation as authorized in Commonwealth Act No. 103, (hereinafter
referred to as "C.A.") or to any pre-trial procedure. 2' There are valid
318 1961 C.I.R. ANN. RrP. 3-4.
314 National Union of Printing Workers v. Asia Printing Co., Gen. Reg. No.
L-8750 (July 20, 1956) citing NLRB v. Barrett Co., 120 F. 2d 583 (7th Cir. 1941).315 Ibid.
310 Sta. Cecilia Sawmills Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-19273 & L-19274 (Feb. 29,
1964).3 17 Information given by former Presiding Judge Jose Bautista, CIR.
S18R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) 1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(b)
(1956).318 Iid. 320 Ibid. 32-11bid.
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reasons behind the prohibitions. Resort to mediation and conciliation is
prohibited, as such techniques are incompatible with the nature of an
unfair labor practice which is in effect a public offense, and thus not
subject to compromise. 22 Resort to pre-trial procedure is also pre-
cluded, partly for the same reason and partly because many objectives
of a pre-trial conference have already been achieved by the preliminary
investigation of the charge.
Under the act, the trial judge or the hearing examiner is intended to
assume full responsibility for the conduct of the hearing, in the light of
these directives: (1) He "shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to the technicalities of law and procedure";"' (2) he is not con-
fined to the evidence presented by the parties during the hearing, but
may avail himself of other means of information, such as ocular
inspections and questioning of expert witnesses;"' and (3) "[I] t shall
be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Examiner to
examine and cross-examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to
assist in the orderly presentation of evidence." '25
In support of this active role, the trial judge may exercise the powers
inherent in regular courts, including the power to issue various kinds
of subpoenas, to place witnesses under oath, and to punish for con-
tempt.2 The hearing examiner shares virtually the same powers, with
the exception of the power to punish for contempt, which must be
meted out by the court on due complaint.827
The trial may be before a member of the court, or before the hearing
examiner designated by the court.2 8 It shall be public and may be held
in Manila, or in any of the other cities where a branch of the court sits,
or in any other place, depending on the convenience of the parties. "9
Witnesses shall be in attendance, and documents produced, on sub-
poenas previously requested and issued by the judge or hearing exam-
iner.3 Witnesses may be called, examined, or cross-examined by the
hearing examiner, by the prosecutor, and by the parties or their coun-
sel."  The respondent has the right to appear and give his testimony.3 2
322 Ibid. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
320 R.A. No. 875, § 5(e) (1953, as amended, PHUm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(e)
(1956).
32T C.A. No. 103, § 6 (1936), as amended, PnnL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 9 (1956).
328 R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) (1953), PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42 § 37(b) (1956).
329 1961 CIR ANN. REP. 3.
330R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) (1953), as amended, PHrL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(b)
(1956).
33L Ibid. 332 Ibid.
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In addition, the hearing examiner or trial judge may resort to other
sources of information authorized by the act. He may call for expert
witnesses, additional ordinary witnesses, the production of documents,
papers and objects, conduct ocular inspections and ask any person for
information or data relative to the object of inspection.3
Decisions and orders. The hearing examiner, or commissioner,
merely submits a report; he does not decide the case. The initial deci-
sion is rendered by the judge to whom the case has been assigned.334
While in practice, the trial judge relies on the report of the hearing
examiner, the act enjoins that the record provide the basis of the deci-
sion." ' The evidence of record which the trial judge may consider in-
cludes the evidence presented by the parties as well as evidence secured
through other means on his own initiative. 36 Whether or not the evi-
dence of record sustains the complaint for unfair labor practice, it is
required that the court state its findings of fact; otherwise a remand is
proper.3 ' This is essential, as review by the Supreme Court is largely
directed to ascertaining whether the findings of fact are supported by
the evidence of record. 38 Where such evidence is found, the findings
are not disturbed." 9 The CIR en banc is not, however, bound by the
findings of the trial judge and may modify them 40 Where the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence, the decision may be set
aside. 4'
333 Ibid.
334 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 7 (1936), as amended, Pinm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 4,
para. 7 (1956).
336R.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 37(c)(1956).336 R.A. No. 875, § 5(b) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(b)
(1956).
83R.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, Pum. ANN. LAws tit 42, § 37 (c)
(1956).
838 E.g., National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961).
839 Manila Metal Caps & Tin Can Mfg. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17578 (July
31, 1963); ICAWO v. Bautista, Gen. Reg. No. L-15639 (April 30, 1963); Santiago
Rice Mill v. Santiago Labor Union alias Magat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-18040(Aug. 31, 1962) ; FEU v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17620 (Aug. 31, 1962) ; NARIC v.
NARIC Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-18058 (Aug. 30, 1962) ; National Fastener
Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961) ; SMB v. Santos, Gen. Reg. No.
L-12682 (Aug. 31, 1961); Permanent Concrete Prods. v. Frivaldo, Gen. Reg. No.
L-14179 (Sept. 15, 1960); Cia. Maritima v. United Seamen's Union, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9923 (June 20, 1958); Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16992(Dec. 23, 1961) ; Henares v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-17535 (Dec. 28, 1961) ; Donato
v. PHILMAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-12506 (May 18, 1959).340 PLASLU v. Kim San Rice & Corn Mill Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18235 (Oct. 30,
1962).
341 Superintendent of La Loma Catholic Cemetery v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13365(July 31, 1963); Findlay Millar Timber Co. v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-18217(Sept. 29, 1962); Ormoc Sugar Co. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, Gen.
Reg. No. L-15826 (Jan. 23, 1961) ; Management of El Hogar v. Filipino Mutual Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-9740 (March 30, 1960) ; Royal Interocean Lines v.
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The court may order dismissal where the charge of unfair labor
practice is not proved,342 where the complaint is withdrawn, 43 and
where a valid ground to dismiss is shown. 44
The act states: If after investigation the Court shall be of the opinion
that no person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of
fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. If the com-
plaining party withdraws its complaint, the Court shall dismiss the
case.
345
No award of relief for the complainant can be made in the order of
dismissal. 46
A dismissal based on an alleged withdrawal of the complaint may be
set aside on a showing by the party concerned that the withdrawal was
in fact unauthorized, and the case may be reinstated and tried by a
judge, even without the intervention of the CIR prosecutor and not-
withstanding the fact that the judge was merely directed by the CIR
en banc to receive evidence on the motion for reinstatement of the
case.847
Reinstatement. The act directs that if, after investigation, the court
is of the opinion
that any person named in the complaint, has engaged or is engaging in
any unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but
not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without backpay and
including rights of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority.34"
In addition, the order may contain directives to secure a more effective
CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-11745 (Oct. 31, 1960); Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys v. United
Employees Welfare Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-15439 (Nov. 29, 1960) ; Operators, Inc.
v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-15073.
342 National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20044 (April
30, 1964) ; NLU v. Insular Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July 31,
1961).
343 E.g., Cano v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15594 (Oct. 31, 1960).344 E.g., UST Press v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-17207 & L-17372 (Oct. 30, 1962);
UST v. UST Hospital Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-12919 (Oct. 30, 1962).
345R.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 37(c)
(1956).
346Malaya Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17881 (April 23, 1963);
Baguio Gold Mining v. Tabisola, Gen. Reg. No. L-15265 (April 27, 1962); NLU v.
Insular Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July 31, 1961).
347 Cano v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15594 (Oct. 31, 1960).34SR.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(c)
(1956).
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enforcement. 49 Reinstatement is the normal mode of relief, where it
will effectuate the policies of the act. Reinstatement is the return to
the position from which one was removed,"' and it does not contem-
plate an appointment or employment in a position which the victim
of unfair labor practice had not previously occupied. 5'
It is not required that reinstatement take place at once. When the
seasonal nature of business precludes immediate employment, rein-
statement means that the employees concerned will be given work
when other like employees are given work. 2 Further, reinstatement is
not a right when no unfair labor practice is found,"3 or when the
employer has no need for the services of the employee."' Further, if
the employee is guilty of subsequent serious misconduct, 5 or has
found substantially equivalent employment, reinstatement does not
necessarily follow. 6
The CIR is empowered to order reinstatement even where the victim
of unfair labor practice has already found employment elsewhere, as
long as it is not "substantially equivalent and regular employment.)35 T
It has been held that where the victim was previously working as a
faculty member of a private university, his employment at the Central
Bank coupled with part-time teaching at a government college was not
"substantially equivalent and regular employment." This was not
merely due to disparity of earnings, but rather because his special
training and aptitude better equipped him as a faculty member than
as a clerk, and his chances for promotion at his former job were better
than his chances at the present one. 5
Damages in lieu of reinstatement. Damages may be awarded in lieu
of reinstatement when reinstatement, even if otherwise proper, is not
possible. Where a bus operator had sold his business to avoid his duty
to bargain collectively with a union representing his employees, and
the transferee acted in good faith, reinstatement was not possible, and
349 E.g., Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-14023 & L-14135 (Jan.
30, 1960).
360 SMB v. Santos, Gen. Reg. No. L-12682 (Aug. 31, 1961).351 Columbian Rope Factory v. Tacloban Assn of Laborers & Employees, Gen. Reg.
No. L-14848 (Oct. 31, 1962). See also note 350 supra.
332 Ibid.
-53 See cases cited note 346 supra.
35 E.g., NLU v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14975 (May 15, 1962).
856 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30, 1964).
356 Ibid.
357 ILA. No. 875, § 2(d) (1953) as amended, PHm. ANx. LAws tit. 42, § 34(d)
(1956).
818 FEU v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17620 (Aug. 31, 1962).
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an award for wages corresponding to six months from the date of cessa-
tion of employment was deemed an adequate substitute."' Similarly,
where employees were unlawfully locked out through a closure of busi-
ness, which was effected through fictitious transactions, no reinstate-
ment was ordered, but an award for damages corresponding to the
wages which could have been earned during the unexpired portion of
the existing collective bargaining agreement was deemed proper.36
Where operation of a bus line was discontinued to the prejudice of em-
ployees unlawfully discriminated against, reinstatement was denied on
a showing that a resumption of the line was not possible, since the cor-
responding certificate of public convenience had been cancelled.361
However, back wages were awarded to the employees up to the date of
cancellation, except as to those employees who were re-employed in
other lines operated by the firm. For these employees backpay was
due only until the date of re-employment if this was prior to cancella-
tion of the certificate. 2
In exceptional cases, where reinstatement is proper but cannot be
immediately effected because the place of business where the victim
was previously employed has been closed, the CIR may require that
the employee be placed on a preferred list and assigned a position of
employment as soon as a suitable one has become vacant.6 Along
with reinstatement the CIR may direct restoration of "rights of em-
ployees prior to dismissal including seniority." ' 4 The CIR has been
upheld in directing restoration of employee privileges enjoyed previous
to the unlawful separation or dismissal. 65
Back wages. Like other modes of relief, backpay may be awarded
where, in the opinion of the CIR, it is necessary to effectuate the poli-
cies of the act. Only in one case is backpay mandatory. Section 15
provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to declare a lockout with-
out having first bargained collectively with his employees, in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Act. Any employee whose work has
359 Fernando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962).
360 Majestic & Republic Theaters Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12607
(Feb. 28, 1962).
361 Mindanao Motor Line v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18418 (Nov. 29, 1962).
362 Ibid.
363 Baron v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17717 (July 31, 1963) ; Columbian Rope Factory
v. Tacloban Ass'n of Laborers & Employees, Gen. Reg. No. L-14848 (Oct. 31, 1962),
citing 56 C.J.S. 338, and Williams Motor Co., 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942). Also,
Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1940).
364 R.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37 (c)
(1956).36 5 Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-14023 & L-14135 (Jan. 30,
1960).
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stopped as a consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to back-
pay. '1 866
In most cases, reinstatement is with backpay. Where reinstatement
is a matter of right, backpay ordinarily will be awarded, unless there
are circumstances which justify denial or reduction, such as the good
faith of the employer.8 ' Absent such circumstances, the CIR may not
deny backpay. 8 When, however, such circumstances are present, the
CIR has discretion to deny or reduce backpay."I
A number of cases have held that the good faith of the employer
may preclude or diminish recovery of backpay.37 0 Where employees
were dismissed for refusal to join the union with which the employer
had executed a closed shop agreement, in the reasonable belief that
he was duty bound to comply with the unions demand, it was held that
although an unfair labor practice had been committed and reinstate-
ment was proper, a denial of backpay did not constitute abuse of
discretion, in view of the good faith of the employer." 1 Normally, a
backpay award is incidental to reinstatement. However, reinstatement
is not necessary, to sustain an award for backpay.372
If an employer guilty of unfair labor practices offers to take back
the workers on substantially the same terms as prior to discharge, a
refusal by the workers to return is grounds for denial of backpay for
the period beginning with the date of refusal.7 8 Nevertheless, it has
also been held that the victim of an unfair labor practice is under no
duty to accept an offer of re-employment, where the offer did not
include payment of backpay during the period of unlawful discharge. 74
306 R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, PHnm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 47 (1956).867 Big Five Prods. Workers Union v. CIP, Gen. Reg. No. L-17600 (July 31, 1963).
868 Ibid.36 9 Henares v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-17535 (Dec. 28, 1961) ; Velez v. Watchmen's
Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12639 (April 27, 1960).
370 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (1964); Findlay
Millar Timber Co. v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-18217 & L-18222 (Sept. 29, 1962);
Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-15447-8 (Jan. 31, 1962); San
Carlos Milling Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15453 & L-15723 (March 29, 1962);
Freeman Shirt Mfg. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16561 (Jan. 28, 1961); NLU v.
Insular Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July 31, 1961) ; NLU v. Zip
Venetian Blinds Co., Gen. Reg. Nos. L-15827-78 (May 31, 1961).37 1Findlay Miller Timber Co. v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-18217 & L-18222
(Sept. 29, 1962) ; Freeman Shirt Mfg. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16561 (Jan. 28,
1961); NLU v. Insular Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July 31,
1961); Dinglasan v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-14183 (Nov. 28, 1959); NLU v. Zip
Venetian Blinds Co., Gen. Reg. Nos. L-15817-18 (May 31, 1961).3 7 2 Mindanao Motor Lines v. CIR Gen. Reg. No. L-18418 (Nov. 29, 1962) ; Fer-
nando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962); Erlanger &
Galinger, Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15118 (Dec. 29, 1960).373 Dinglasan v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-14183 (Nov. 28, 1959).3 74 Cano v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15594 (Oct. 31, 1960).
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A duty is imposed on the victims of unfair labor practices to mitigate
the losses of employers. It is incumbent on employees to make a
reasonable effort to secure other employment. In case of failure to
exert a reasonable effort, the employer will be liable only for a reason-
able period after which the employee could have found work had he
exerted due diligence." 5
Execution of awards. The order of the court granting relief to the
complainant is immediately enforceable and executory, as the act
provides that appeal does not stay the order of the court." 6 Never-
theless, execution may be stayed under the provisions of section 14
of C.A. No. 103, which authorizes stay by the CIR of its orders for
special reasons and under certain conditions."
Contempt proceedings lie for wilful refusal to comply with an
order of reinstatement." 8 In such proceedings, however, it is essential
to establish service of the order for reinstatement upon the person
named in the order, either by actual service on his person, or on
someone whom he has authorized to receive service in his behalf." 9
While the CIR may properly decline to enter an order for contempt,
the CIR is authorized to direct that if the person required to make
reinstatement still fails to comply with the order, he will be commit-
ted, on proper motion, to jail until he complies."' Awards for back-
pay, damages, or both may be enforced in the same manner as money
judgments of the courts of first instance. 8'
Review of CIR decisions. Two remedies lie against orders of the
court, whether for dismissal or otherwise: (1) a motion for reconsid-
eration addressed to the CIR en banc;... and (2) appeal to the
Supreme Court. These remedies are cumulative, not alternative. 3
It is a settled rule that before a decision or order of a member or
judge of the CIR may be appealed to the Supreme Court, a motion
for reconsideration must first be filed with the CIR en banc.3 4 This
.75 Sta. Cecilia Sawmills v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-19273 & L-19274 (Feb. 29, 1964).
376R.A. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, PHi. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 38 (1956).
See Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Bugay, Gen. Reg. No. L-10265 (July
31, 1958).
37 Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-14023, No. L-14135 (Jan. 30, 1960).
378R.A. No. 875, § 5(e) (1953), as amended, PHi. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37(e)
(1956).379 Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Tantongo, Gen. Reg. No.
L-18338 (Oct. 31, 1962).
380 Yu Ki Lam v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-9506 (Sept. 14, 1956).
381 C.A. No. 103, § 23 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 43, § 27 (1956).
382 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 8 (1936), as amended, PHi.. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 4
(1956).
383 R.A. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 38 (1956).
384 Broce v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959) ; citing Manila Terminal
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rule also applies to the decisions of individual judges in unfair labor
practice cases. While the act conferred power upon any judge as well
as the court to decide unfair labor practice cases,"'5 and provides for
appeal without specifically requiring a motion for reconsideration be-
fore the CIR en banc, 8  the Supreme Court gave section 1, C.A. No.
103 suppletory effect. 8 ' Accordingly, before an appeal under section
6 of the act may be brought to the Supreme Court, a motion for
reconsideration should be filed with the CIR en banc. A failure to
make such a motion for reconsideration is fatal to the appeal.8
In order that the motion for reconsideration may be entertained
on the merits, and a basis provided for appeal to the Supreme Court,
it is essential that technical requirements be complied with. Where
a motion had been rightly dismissed for failure to submit arguments
within ten days as prescribed by the CIR rules, the decision sought to
be reconsidered was held to have become final. 89 Likewise, a motion
for reconsideration was deemed properly dismissed, where it was
opposed for lack of service on the other party.89 It is within the
discretion of the CIR en banc to set motions for reconsideration for
oral argument." 1 The CIR en banc is not bound by the findings of
the trial judge and may reverse or modify the decisions after which
it may draw the appropriate legal consequence. '
The act states that "any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court within ten days after the
issuing the Court's order ... "1.. Certiorari, as a rule, will not lie
and constitutes an improper remedy.8 ' It has been held that where,
instead of direct appeal, an aggrieved party filed a special civil action
of certiorari in the Supreme Court, and as a consequence, the period
of appeal expired without an appeal having been filed and perfected,
the decision became final.89
Relief & Mut. Ass'n v. Manila Terminal Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-4150 (March 20, 1951);
Rizal Cement Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10312 (July 26, 1957).
885 R.A. No. 875, § 5 (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 37 (1956).
380 R.A. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, Pnn.. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 38 (1956).887 Broce v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959).
88 Ibid.
389 Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16682 (July 26, 1963) ; Local
7, Press & Printing Free Workers v. Tabigne, Gen. Reg. No. L-16093 (Nov. 29, 1960).890 Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Bugay, Gen. Reg. No. L-9327
(March 30, 1957).
391 Permanent Concrete Prods. v. Frivaldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-14179 (Sept. 15, 1960).
392PLASLU v. Kin San Rice & Corn Mill Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18235 (Oct. 30,
1962).
393R.A. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 38 (1956).894 Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-9900 (April 30, 1957).
395 Ibid.
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In the appeal, questions of fact as well as questions of law may be
raised. But questions of fact are subject to a limited review. The act
provides that "the findings of the Court with respect to questions of
fact if supported by substantial evidence of record shall be conclu-
sive." '96 In evaluating the evidence, the test of substantiality is not
whether a preponderance supports the decision, but whether the evi-
dence relied upon by the CIR is at all credible.39 If so, the presence
of circumstances militating against the decision does not warrant rever-
sal.39 In evaluating testimony, the quality, not the quantity, of wit-
nesses should be the primary consideration. 9'
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Bargaining unit. The question of an appropriate bargaining unit is
usually presented to the Court of Industrial Relations in petitions
for certification and for certification of elections.""0 However, the ques-
tion may also arise in connection with other matters under the act,
such as the alleged invalidity of a closed shop agreement. 0 ' In such
cases, it is the function of the court to determine whether an existing
or proposed collective bargaining unit is appropriate.
The Supreme Court has approved the adoption of rules fashioned
by the agency in charge of enforcing the United States law on labor
relations-the National Labor Relations Board." 2 In the determina-
tion of an appropriate bargaining unit, the CIR may resort to the
guides fashioned by that agency, adopting them insofar as circum-
stances permit. These guides include: (1) will of the employees
(Globe doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compen-
sation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history;
396 RtA. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 38 (1956).
397 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961). Also
Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16682 (July 26, 1963); Sanchez v.
CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19000 (July 31, 1963); Manila Metal Caps & Tin Cans Mfg.
Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17578 (July 31, 1963).
39 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961).
399 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No.
L-15826 (Jan. 23, 1961).
400 R.A. No. 875, § 12 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44 (1956).
401 In order that a closed shop agreement will be valid, it is required that the con-
tracting union is a "representative" of the employees in the bargaining unit, Sta. Cecilia
Sawmills v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-19273 & L-19274 (Feb. 29, 1964) ; Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co. v. National Employees Workers Security Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-9003
(Dec. 21, 1956).
402 Democratic Labor Ass'n v. Cebu Stevedoring, Gen. Reg. No. L-10321 (Feb. 28,
1958).
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and (4) employment status, for example, whether temporary, sea-
sonal or probationary employees.0 3
An ever recurring basic test is whether or not the grouping yields
as homogeneous a collective interest as is possible under the circum-
stances of the case. The holding of a "Globe election" by the CIR
in a proceeding presenting the question of severance of certain craft
unions from an established plant-wide unit has been sustained by
the Supreme Court. 04 Next to mutuality of interest, the history of
bargaining in the plant of the employer concerned has been regarded
as the most persuasive criterion in resolving unit controversies. Al-
though the history of collective bargaining by different unions with
management, together with other circumstances, indicates the appro-
priateness of the employer unit, history is not decisive where other
factors favor the maintenance of a newly instituted system."0 '
The long history of a single employer unit has been disregarded,
where the distribution of membership among the unions followed a
basic cleavage in interests between two work groups-the permanent,
and the casual employees °8 Notwithstanding previous bargaining his-
tory on a craft basis, the establishment of an employer unit was upheld
where it had been agreed upon between the two contending unions."0
Based on the above principles, bargaining units have been organ-
ized as employer units where the work force of a company engaged
in the milling of sugar cane included piece workers and stevedores on
the payrolls,"0 8 and also where the employer unit had been agreed
upon by the contending unions0 0
Separate bargaining units have been established on the basis of
craft, or the nature of the work done, as regards the following occupa-
tional groups: musicians engaged in furnishing background music
in the making of moving picture films;-10 watchmen hired for guard
duty on ships owned by different shipping companies or agencies while
403 Ibid. Citing ROTHENBERG, LABOR REATIONS 482-510 (1949).
4o0Kapisanan ng toga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Yard Crew Union, Gen. Reg. No.
L-16292; MRR v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16317-18 (Oct. 31, 1960).
40 5 Benguet Consol. Inc. v. Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-11029 &
L-11065 (May 23, 1958).4 0o6 Democratic Labor Ass'n v. Cebu Stevedoring, Gen. Reg. No. L-10321 (Feb. 28,
1958).
402 Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, Gen. Reg. No. L-8049 (May 9, 1956).
08 PLASLU v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14656 (Nov. 29, 1960).
40 Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, Gen. Reg. No. L-8049 (May 9, 1956).
410 LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, Gen. Reg. No. L-12586 (Jan.
28, 1961).
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the ships are in the port of Manila; "11 and salesmen working fulltime
in the distribution of the products of an appliance manufacturer. "1 '
Multiple plant units under a single employer were established in
a case where the operations of a logging and lumber concern were
spread in five work camps located at considerable distances from one
another."1 Another example is the segregation of the employees of
a tobacco manufacturing concern employed in its administrative, sales,
and dispensary departments, from the production and maintenance
staff, and their establishment as a separate bargaining unit on the
basis of a greater community of interest. 1 '
The problem of fragmentation. In several cases, special employee
groups have been carved off established employer units and recognized
as separate bargaining units entitled to separate representation and
separate bargaining contracts. Thus, the CIR permitted the Manila
Railroad Company (now Philippine National Railways), a govern-
ment firm, which previously constituted one employer unit, to be
split into three bargaining units: one for train crews, another for
engine crews, and the third for the rest of the railroad employees." 5
The Philippine Air Lines, also a government firm, is now constituted
into various bargaining units, including one for airline pilots and
another for engineers and maintenance men." 6 The CIR has also
recognized separate bargaining units for musicians in movie produc-
tion companies,1 ' for administrative, sales and dispensary personnel
in a tobacco manufacturing company,1 8 and for salesmen in a firm
manufacturing appliances. " 9
The CIR has repeatedly promised recognition of separate bargain-
ing units on a finding of a community of interest among the special
employee groups favored, which sets them apart from the rest of the
employees in the firms concerned. Nevertheless, this practice is pro-
411 Maligaya Ship Watchmen Agency v. Associated Watchmen & Security Union,
Gen. Reg. Nos. L-12214-7 (May 28, 1958).4 l Ysmael & Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14280 (May 30, 1960).
41 Benguet Consol. Inc. v. Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-11029,
L-11065 (May 23, 1958). For a similar treatment of the work force of a railroad see
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Yard Crew Union, Gen. Reg. Nos.
L-16292-94; MRR v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-16309, L-16317-8 (Oct. 31, 1960).
414 Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co. v. Alhambra Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg.
No. L-13573 (Feb. 20, 1960).
415 Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Yard Crew Union, Gen. Reg. Nos.
L-16292-4; MRR v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-16309, L-16317-18 (Oct. 31, 1960).
416 1962 PAL ANN. REPORT 28-29.
417 LUN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, Gen. Reg. No. L-12586 (Jan.
28, 1961).4
:s Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Mfg. Co. v. Alhambra Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg.
No. L-13573 (Feb. 20, 1960).
419 Ysmael & Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14280 (May 30, 1960).
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ductive of serious disadvantages not only for the employees as a whole,
but for employers as well. In the first place, the fragmentation of
the work force into several bargaining units greatly weakens bargain-
ing power of the employee group as a whole. By segregating the highly
skilled workers into separate units of their own, the rest of the em-
ployees, although more numerous, are thereby rendered less able to
effectively bargain. Thus, pilots of the Philippine Airlines and train
crews of the Philippine National Railways, because of their importance
to operations, are able to secure tremendous benefits, while the ordinary
employees comprising the other bargaining units are given meager
concessions. The result is an ever-increasing disparity in employment
conditions between bargaining units of highly skilled workers and
bargaining units of unskilled workers. Secondly, the difficulties of
management are increased through multiplication of bargaining units.
Instead of facing one labor representative and negotiating one con-
tract, the employer must face several representatives and negotiate a
series of contracts. The disadvantage is clear when it is remembered
that even if the negotiations with all other units are satisfactory, a
strike in any one unit can paralyze operations.42 Thus, the employer
whose work force is fragmented into multiple units is more vulnerable
to interruptions in production. These considerations indicate that the
CIR should reexamine its practice in this regard and consider the
possibility of adopting the policy of the NLRB on the matter. 2'
Selection of the bargaining representative. After a bargaining unit
has been established as appropriate, it remains to be determined which
labor organization will represent the unit. This question is of partic-
ular concern where a bargaining unit has been recognized and in
service over a long period of time. In such cases, the propriety of
the unit is not in question; it is rather which union, if any at all, is
to represent the unit.
In many cases, the question of establishing a new unit, or re-
establishment or reorganization of an existing unit along a different
basis (as from an employer unit to multiple plant units), is presented
in the petition for certification of the petitioning union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the new or reorganized unit or units.412
420 1962 PAL ANN. REPoRT 24-26.42 1 American Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939). Columbus Belt Works Co., 62
N.L.R.B. 978 (....).4 2 2 Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR v. Yard Crew Union, Gen. Reg. Nos.
L-16292-94 (Oct. 31, 1960); LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, Gen.
Reg. No. L-12586 (Jan. 28, 1961); Ysmael & Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14280
(May 30, 1960).
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A change in the existing situation is proposed (in the form of a new
unit or a reorganized unit) as a preliminary question, on which the
issue of the certification sought depends. When the proposal for a
new or reorganized unit succeeds, the case proceeds to the issue of
which labor organization should be certified as the representative.
Where the creation of a new unit or a proposed reorganization is not
deemed appropriate, the frequent result is that there will be no point
in resolving the question of certification, since there may be a current
exclusive representative for the established unit.
The principle governing appointment or designation of an employee
representative for an appropriate bargaining unit is majority choice.'23
The will of the majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit, if clear, is to be respected no matter in what form manifested.
This may be ascertained with or without the intervention of the
courts; and in the former case, with or without an election, depending
on the circumstances. 4
Where the majority choice is clear, the status of exclusive bargain-
ing representative may be achieved without formal proceedings. This
happens often in cases where there is only one union to which most,
if not all, of the employees belong.2 5 In many cases, however, there
are at least two rival unions claiming to represent the majority of the
employees in the unit. In such cases, either union may seek its designa-
tion as representative, or the minority union, as well as the employer
or the required percentage of employees, may petition for a certifica-
tion election. In any of these cases, where the question of majority
choice is in doubt, the CIR may order a certification election.
Under the act, a union may be constituted the exclusive bargaining
representative without CIR intervention. This usually comes about
when a union (whether sole or one of several) in an appropriate unit
for which there has been no certified exclusive bargaining represen-
tative nor one formally recognized by the employer in a collective
bargaining contract, requests the employer for recognition, and the
employer, upon being satisfied that the requesting union represents
a majority of the employees in the unit, accedes to the request and
recognizes the union as the exclusive bargaining agent. 2 6 However,
423R.A. No. 875, § 12 (a) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44,
(1956).
424 R.A. No. 875, § 12 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44 (1956).
425 Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. v. National Employees Workers Security Union,
Gen. Reg. No. L-9003 (Dec. 21, 1956).
426 Ibid.
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the employer may decline to recognize a union when its majority
status is doubtful because disputed by a rival union."'
Certification proceedings, with or without an election, may be
categorized as follows: where certification is sought in connection with
a proposed unit; where certification is sought in an established unit,
in the absence of a certified or recognized bargaining representative;
and where certification, or a certification election, is sought, notwith-
standing an existing certified or recognized bargaining agent. All
certification petitions of this nature are subject to the following
requirements: (1) If not filed by an employer, 2 the petition must
have the support of at least ten per cent of the employees in the unit.
If so, an election may become mandatory where there is doubt as
to majority status of any of the unions concerned and where the cer-
tification year, if any, has already lapsed;4"9 (2) that an existing con-
tract does not bar an election; 430 and, (3) that a suspension of the
proceedings is not otherwise justified.4"'
In any case where a question of representation is presented, any
union concerned may be certified as the bargaining representative
without an election. Certification may be made: where there is an
appropriate existing unit or proposed unit which is found satisfactory;
where a legitimate labor organization, in full possession of its rights
and found not to be company dominated, is shown to have majority
status; and, if no circumstance or condition exists which would bar
a certification election if one should be ordered or which would
require the CIR to suspend the proceedings. 82
Certification elections. In the foregoing situations, if after investiga-
tion and hearing, there appears to be a reasonable doubt as to the
choice of the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, certifica-
tion elections may be ordered by the CIR, either upon its own initia-
tive433 or upon petition of interested parties. 4 Under the act, a certifi-
cation election may be ordered upon the express petition of the follow-
42
T National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20044 (April
30, 1964).
428 R.A. No. 875, § 12(d) (1953), as amended, Piam. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 44(d)
,1956).
,6R.A. No. 875, § 12(c) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44(c)
(1956).
480 See cases cited note 444 infra.
431 See cases cited note 451 infra.
432 E.g., Young Men Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb.
26, 1965).
433 Ibid.
434 E.g., Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, Gen. Reg. No. L-8049 (May 9, 1956).
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ing: if there is a duly recognized or certified majority union, by the
minority union representing ten per cent of the employees in the
unit;435 where there is a currently recognized or certified majority
union, by at least ten per cent of the employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit;43 and when requested to bargain collectively, by the
employer, whether or not there is a recognized or certified bargaining
agent, provided the other conditions are satisfied." 7
In an injunction suit filed with the CIR by the employer against
two unions to prevent them from interfering with its operations, the
CIR is authorized to order a certification election to determine which
union shall act as representative for the unit, even in the absence of
an express petition to that effect."'
Notwithstanding doubt as to the continuing majority of a certified
or recognized representative, a certification election, whether petitioned
for or not, will not be ordered: where the certification year has not
yet lapsed;. 9 where there is an existing collective bargaining con-
tract4" (subject to exceptions) ;441 where a union seeking to participate
in such elections has been charged as company-dominated through an
unfair labor practice suit based on this ground against the employer,
and an objection to further proceedings on the petition for election is
interposed by any other union seeking to participate in the elec-
tions;442 and where the union claiming representation rights is not a
legitimate labor organization, or has ceased to be such by final order
or judgment at the time the matter is heard.4 '
The rule that an existing collective bargaining contract is a bar
to an election is established.444 This rule is not founded upon an
express provision of the act, but upon a well-established administrative
practice initiated by the United States National Labor Relations
43 R.A. No. 875, § 12(b) (1953), as amended, PHIa. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44(b)
(1956).
436R.A. No. 875, § 12(c) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44(c)
(1956).
437 R.A. No. 875, § 12(d) (1953), as amended, PHIa. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44(d)
(1956).
438 E.g., Young Men Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb.
26, 1965).
439 R.A. No. 875, § 12(b) (1953), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 44(b)
(1956).
440 See cases cited note 444 infra.
441 Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, Gen. Reg. No. L-8049 (May 9, 1956).
442 Standard Cigarette Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9908 (April 22, 1957).
443 See note 464 infra.
44 PLASLU v. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-11910 (Aug. 31,
1960); PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT, Gen. Reg. No. L-8138 (Aug. 20, 1955);
Gen. Maritime Stevedores Union v. South Sea Shipping Line, Gen. Reg. No. L-14687
(July 26, 1960).
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Board."' Under existing precedent, the following requisites must
appear in order for the contract to operate as a bar to an election:
it must be reasonable in duration;"' the contract must be adequate
in that it comprises the substantial terms and conditions of employ-
ment; 447 and unseasonableness of the petition in relation to the pro-
posed renewal of the existing contract.4 48
The Supreme Court has indicated approval of applying the prin-
ciple of substitution in cases where an election is ordered by the
CIR notwithstanding an existing contract which has been found to
be of unreasonable duration.449 The new agent may still bargain,
however, for purposes of shortening the period of the existing agree-
ment, or as to matters not covered, or as to grievances arising under
the contract."'
Where there are pending proceedings which might disqualify a
labor union interested in representing the employees in a given unit,
circumstances may justify, or even require, the suspension of proceed-
ings on a petition for a certification election. This situation may exist
in unfair labor practice suits where company domination is charged,45
and in any case where a union is charged with having failed to bargain
collectively."" Anyone who will be prejudiced by -the participation
of a labor union which may later turn out to be disqualified through
"disestablishment" or forfeiture of its legitimate status, is entitled to
ask for suspension of the proposed election.45 However, where an
employer sought suspension of the election while the union which
preferred the charge of company domination opposed suspension,
pressing instead for an election, suspension was held improper.454
Duty to bargain collectively. The scheme in the act for achieving
industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private agreement
445 PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT, Gen. Reg. No. L-8138 (Aug. 20, 1955),
citing WERNE, LAW oF LABOR RELATIONS, 27-29 (1951) and MATHEWS, LABOR RELA-
TIONS AND THE LAW, 191-92 (1953).44 0 PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT, Gen. Reg. No. L-8138 (Aug. 20, 1955);
Gen. Maritime Stevedores Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines Co., Gen. Reg. No.
L-14687 (July 26, 1960).447 Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, Gen. Reg. No. L-8049 (May 9, 1956).
448 PLASLU v. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-11910 (Aug. 31,
1960).449 Gen. Maritime Stevedores Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines, Gen. Reg. No.
L-14687 (July 26, 1960).
50 Ibid.
-l" Standard Cigarette Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9908 (April 22, 1957),
citing 36 C.J.S. 177.
452R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, Pinm. AN1. LAWS tit. 42, § 47 (1956).
453Manila Paper Mills Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-11963 (June 20,
1958).
401 Standard Cigarette Workers vs. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9908 (April 22, 1957).
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between the employer and his employees as to the terms and conditions
under which the employer is to provide work and the employees to
furnish their labor. Contract is the cornerstone of a harmonious
relationship between labor and management. The problem is how
to bring the parties to an agreement. We have seen how the law
nourishes the formation and growth of independent and responsible
unions as the means to giving labor bargaining power which is approx-
imately equal to that of the employer. We have noted the procedures
by which the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit select or
designate the union as shall seem to them most able and efficient in
representing their interest. Once the exclusive bargaining agent has
been chosen the stage is set for procedures and processes which look
to an agreement as the end in view. The process is known as collective
bargaining, and the resulting agreement is the collective bargaining
contract.
Since agreement between labor and management is the key to
industrial peace, the law does the best it can to regulate the collective
bargaining process so as to facilitate a meeting of the minds. The
act creates a situation whereby the greatest likelihood of eventual
agreement is fostered without actually compelling the parties to
agree. This is done by imposing on both management and union
representatives the so-called duty to bargain collectively. Contractual
freedom is reconciled with this duty, because, while it exacts an obliga-
tion to bargain, it imposes no duty to agree. 5
This duty aims at having the parties conform to prescribed proce-
dures in their negotiations, which are believed to bring about greater
chances of agreement than there would be otherwise. The act brings
to bear upon the parties the techniques of confrontation, discussion,
mutual persuasion, mediation, and conciliation, as a means of inducing
accommodation and concessions towards an eventual agreement. The
duty to bargain, in the absence of a contract, includes bargaining for
the purposes of negotiating an agreement respecting terms and condi-
tions of employment," 6 executing a written contract as to the
terms already agreed upon,.57 refraining from coercive activity until
prior resort has been had to bargaining, and until the lapse of the
"cooling off" period. 5 The duty to bargain where there is an existing
contract includes: bargaining on the adjustment of any grievance
455 R.A. No. 875, § 13 (1953), as amended, Pani. ANN. LAWS tit 42, § 45 (1956).
456 Ibid.
457 Ibid.
458 R.A. No. 875, § 14 (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit 42, § 46 (1956).
[VOL. 40 :780
PHILIPPINE LABOR LAW
or question arising under the contract;"5 9 the giving of a written prior
notice of a proposed termination or modification of the agreement;...
and refraining from coercive activity for a period of thirty days from
the date of notice. 6'
Where the collective bargaining agreement provides for a grievance
procedure, bargaining for purposes of adjustment of any grievance
arising under the contract cannot be insisted upon by a party unless
there is prior compliance with the prescribed grievance procedure. 6
Unions have a special obligation to refrain from imposing "feather-
bedding" practices on employers. Any violation of this duty constitutes
an unfair labor practice subject to the usual remedies.6
Coercive acts, such as strike or lockout, are not wholly forbidden
by the act. In fact, their legality is recognized. But the duty to
bargain includes refraining from a strike or lockout at definite times
stated in the act. In the absence of an agreement, these periods are
before the bargaining process has begun, before notice of an inten-
tion to strike or to lockout has been filed with the Department of
Labor, and before the statutory "cooling off" period has expired.4 6
Where there is an existing agreement, the duty includes refraining
from a strike or lockout: before notice has been given of the proposed
termination or modification of the contract; before the arrival of
the expiration date of the contract, or the date on which the modifica-
tion or termination, notice of which had been given, is intended to
take effect; before notice of an intention to strike or lockout has
been filed with the Department of Labor; and before the lapse of
the statutory "cooling off" period 65 All of these rules are designed
to provide a "breathing spell" during which collective bargaining can
take place and an agreement may be reached.
The act prescribes certain standards for assessing performance of
the duty to bargain collectively. These include:'66 (1) giving due
notice to proposals as to which bargaining is desired; (2) presenting
a timely reply to proposals which have been duly served; (3) request-
ing a conference to thresh out differences; (4) endeavoring to meet
and confer promptly and expeditiously; (5) endeavoring in any such
450 R.A. No. 875, § 13 (1953), as amended, Pm. ANN. LA-ws tit. 42, § 45 (1956).
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
462 Elizalde Rope Factory Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16419 (May 30, 1963).
463 R.A. No. 875, § 4(b) (3) (1953), as amended, PHni. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 36(b)
(4) (1956).
464 R.A. No. 875, §§ 13, 14 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, §§ 45, 46
(1956).
405 Ibid. 466 Ibid.
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conference to settle the dispute amicably and expeditiously; (6)
bargaining in good faith; (7) executing a written contract incorporat-
ing such agreement as may have been arrived at, if requested by the
other party; (8) refraining from a unilateral termination or modifica-
tion of an existing contract, except after due compliance with the
waiting-and-notice requirement; (9) refraining from coercive action
during the bargaining process, until the statutory notice-and-waiting
requirements have been met. However, it has been held that failure
to reply to proposals within the statutory period of ten days does
not, in itself, constitute an unfair labor practice."'7
Violation of the duty to bargain may involve a refusal to bargain,
notwithstanding requests to do so; bargaining in violation of the fore-
going standards; or coercive action, either without having resorted
to bargaining or in violation of the notice-and-waiting requirements
of the act. Any such violation constitutes an unfair labor practice, and,
whether committed by a union or by an employer, may be proceeded
against in an unfair labor practice suit.46s
While a delay in the consideration of the demand of a bargaining
representative may amount to a refusal to bargain collectively, it has
been held that the failure of a company to answer the demands of
the labor representative after a lapse of four months from presenta-
tion did not in itself amount to a refusal to bargain in view of the
nature of the demands, which were many and required considerable
study."9 In another case involving dismissal of a petition for unfair
labor practices, the CIR was sustained in its finding that there was
no refusal to bargain where the evidence showed that management
attended a meeting called by the union leaders. The demands were
discussed and the employer indicated which demands were acceptable,
which were not acceptable, and which were open to further bargaining.
The fact that there was no reply to the demands within ten days from
their service upon management was immaterial, as the requirement
is merely procedural and non-compliance does not in itself amount
to an unfair labor practice.
A collective bargaining agreement may terminate according to its
467 National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20044 (April
30, 1964).
468 R.A. No. 875, § 4(a) (6) & § 4(b) (4) (1953), as amended, PHrL. ANx. LAWS
tit. 42, § 36(b) (1) (1956).
469 PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095, & Cia. Maritima v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 31, 1957).
470 National Union of Restaurant Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20044 (April
30, 1964).
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terms, or for causes which extinguish contracts. It has been held
that where a contract provided for the right of the parties "to effect
a renewal" upon its termination, this was not subject to automatic
renewal, and was therefore terminated when the term arrived and
the parties failed to negotiate its renewal.""
CONCERTED ACTIVrITIS AND LOCKOUTS
Validity of coercive action. In the Philippine setting, strikes are
almost exclusively of the economic or bargaining type and aimed at
coercing the employer into giving the economic benefits demanded.
Only rarely have strikes against employer abuses been declared. In
recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has recognized strikes
against unfair labor practices of the employer.
The recognition of the strike as a legitimate weapon of labor is
clearly indicated in many provisions of the act," 2 as well as in such
statutes as the Minimum Wage Law!'7 and the Court of Industrial
Relations Act."' Under the latter statute, our Supreme Court has
held that the law recognizes the right to strike.," 5 It has also described
"the strike as a legitimate weapon by which labor may enforce its
just demands."'78 In many cases, it has nullified writs of injunction
as well as restraining orders issued against strikers. 7 It has affirmed
the right of public employees to strike, provided that the function
in which they were employed is proprietary
78
In addition to recognition, various provisions of the act extend
legal protection to the right to strike, particularly section 9, which
confers virtual immunity from injunctions and restraining orders, and
section 24, which virtually immunizes labor unions and unionists from
damages resulting from strikes and other concerted activities, on the
the basis of common law doctrines of liability.
Statutory limitations on strikes. Because of their patently injurious
character, strikes are subject to legal control. There are two kinds
471 Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gem Reg. Nos. L-15447-48 (Jan. 31, 1962).
472 R.A. No. 875, §§ 9-11, 13-15, 17-18 & 24 (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAvs
tit. 42, §§ 41-43, 45-47, 49-50 & 56 (1956).
473 R.A. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws, tit. 42, § 78(c)
(1956).
474 C.A. No. 103, §§ 4 & 19 (1936), as amended, Pm. ANN. LAws, tit. 42, §§ 7 &
22 (1956).
475NLU v. CIR, 68 Phil. 732 (1939) ; Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, 70 Phil. 621 (1940).
47 Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, 70 Phil. 621 (1940).
477 E.g., PAFLU v. Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-915 (Aug. 31, 1956) ; Reyes v. Tan, Gen.
Reg. No. L-9137 (Aug. 31, 1956) ; PAFLU v. Barot, Gen. Reg. No. L-9281 (Sept. 28,
1956).
478 NARIC Workers Union v. Alvendia, Gen. Reg. No. L-14439 (March 25, 1960).
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of limitations on the right to strike. The first consists of the common
law doctrines, fashioned by Anglo-American courts and adopted for
use in the Philippine jurisdiction in the absence of statutory regula-
tion, in order to keep concerted activities of organized labor within
tolerable bounds. These judge-made limitations have been in force
here since pre-war days.
The second kind consists of statutory limitations, which are deemed
essential to the furtherance of certain policies. One of the policies
necessitating a restriction of the right to strike is that the terms and
conditions of service in the government are governed only by law.
In support of this basic rule, "it is declared to be the policy of this
Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 4 0 This injunction against strikes is repeated in the Civil
Service Act of 1959,11 and is further reinforced with the prohibition,
reiterated in each current general appropriation act for the national
government, that no money or funds appropriated shall be available
for the payment of any employee or laborer who has engaged in a
strike or who belongs to a union which asserts the right to strike.8 2
Analogous restrictions on the right to strike obtain in the case of
public utilities. Where a strike threatens or exists in a public utility
or a business coupled with a public interest, the government may
take over its operation under conditions fixed by a special law."3
There are further restrictions imposed in aid of the policy to encour-
age collective bargaining. As previously noted, a union may not under-
take a bargaining strike "without having first bargained collectively
with an employer pursuant to this Act. . 8.  This means that before
resorting to a strike to enforce union demands the bargaining represen-
tative is required to see to it that a "previous notice of a desire to
negotiate an agreement has been served upon the other party as
provided in section 14" of the act. With such notice, of course, the
bargaining procedure outlined in section 14 of the act comes into
play. This is significant because it means that bargaining has taken
place before a legitimate resort to strike is sanctioned. If a strike is
contemplated, it would be in connection with a bargaining impasse,
479 Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, 70 Phil. 621 (1940).
480 R.A. No. 875, § 11 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 43 (1956).48 1 R-A. No. 2260, § 28(c) (1959), PHi.. ANN. LAWS. fit. 60, § 55.528 (Supp. 3,
1964).48 2Eg., R.A. No. 2260 (1959), PHil. ANN. LAWS fit. 60, §§§ 500 (Supp. 3, 1964).
488 C.A. No. 358, § 1, para. 3 (1938), PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 62, § 3, para. 3 (1957).
484R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 47 (1956).
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which means that an opportunity for agreement through bargaining
has been afforded the parties as intended by the act.
Where a strike is contemplated as a result of a bargaining impasse,
additional requirements must be met. Before the bargaining represen-
tative can declare a strike, it must within thirty days file with the
Conciliation Service a notice of intention to strike." 5 The notice
brings into the bargaining picture the governmental facilities for
mediation and conciliation. Upon the intervention of the Conciliation
Service, "it shall be the duty of each party to participate fully and
promptly in such meetings and conferences as the Service may
undertake." This duty lasts for the thirty-day period prescribed by
the act, frequently called the "cooling-off period.4 6
Equally elaborate requirements apply to existing collective bargain-
ing agreements subject to renegotiations, through an express provision
for termination or modification. Where the bargaining representative
desires to take advantage of the right to renegotiate or to terminate,
as recognized in the contract, it must comply with certain directives
of the act. It cannot simply give immediate notice of modification,
accompanied by demands for desired changes, or notice of termination,
accompanied with proposals for a new agreement, and then resort to
a strike to enforce the demands. The representative is required to
take certain steps designed to bring the bargaining process into
operation. A written notice of intention to modify or terminate the
agreement, in conformity with its provisions thereon, must be given
for at least thirty days in advance of the expiration date, as explained
before. During this period of thirty days, the representative is obliged,
together with the employer, "to continue in full force and effect all the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement."18 7
Common-law restrictions. Independently of statute, courts subject
strikes to legal control by passing upon their legality through the
so-called "ends-means test."'88 If a particular strike satisfies the
test, it is legal; otherwise, not. This categorization of strikes into
legal and illegal has, of course, consequences of utmost importance
for the strikers. 8 '
A strike must have a lawful purpose. As construed by our Supreme
485 R.A. No. 875, § 14(d) (1953), PHIL. ANNT. LAWS tit 42, § 46(d) (1956).
488 These requirements have no application to unfair labor practice strikces (Cf.,
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
487 R.A. No. 875, § 13 (1953), PHmL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 45 (1956).
48 8 Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, 70 Phil. 621 (1940).
48 D Luzon Marine Dep't Union v. Roldan, Gen. Reg. No. L-2660 (May 30, 1950).
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Court, this rules out not only purposes which are patently contrary
to law or public policy, but also purposes which are trivial, unjust,
or unreasonable. Among the recognized purposes for which a strike
may be lawfully declared are: improvements in the terms and condi-
tions of employment, usually of immediate economic benefit to the
striking employees;... compelling the employer to desist or discontinue
the commission of an unfair labor practice against the striking em-
ployees as a whole or against some of them;4 9' and mutual aid or
protection against employer abuse or oppression. "2
The reasonableness of the demands, or the ability of the employer
to meet them, is no longer the controlling consideration. Rather, the
issue is whether or not the strike relates to a legitimate labor objective.
This is to be determined largely by what the strikers genuinely
believe. " ' In one case, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to
sustain a strike by saying it was "not for a trivial purpose but for
one which they honestly believed was necessary to protect their
interest."4 4 In determining whether or not a lawful purpose motivated
a strike, the question of good faith is a material circumstance. From
the acts or utterances of the employees concerned, or of their represen-
tatives, more or less contemporaneous with a strike, the court may
infer bad faith in the declaration of the strike, with adverse con-
sequences to the persons concerned. 95
It is further required that the strikers have a substantial interest
in the subject of the strike. Thus, a sympathetic strike is deemed
to be an unlawful infliction of damage, unjustified by any advantage
to the group of workers participating in it. The Supreme Court has
held that such a strike cannot be countenanced, as it is highly inimical
not only to the interest of the employer, but also the welfare of the
laborers as well as to the peace and order of the community. 96 In
addition, pacific measures or remedies must first be exhausted before
490 E.g., PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095 & Cia. Maritima v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 31, 1957).
491 E.g., Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30,
1964); PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).4 92 Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, 70 Phil. 621 (1940) ; Standard Coconut Corp. v. CIR,
Gen. Reg. No. L-3733 (July 30, 1951).
493 PECO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-7156 (May 31, 1955). Also, Caltex v. Philip-
pine Labor Organization, Gen. Reg. No. L-4758 (May 30, 1953) ; Central Vegetable
Oil Mfg. Co. v. Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-4061 (May
28, 1952).
494 Ibid.
495 Radio Operators Ass'n v. PHILMAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10112 (Nov. 29,
1957) ; Union of PECO Employees v. PECO, Gen. Reg. No. L-4423 (March 31, 1952).
496 Dee Chuan & Sons v. Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas,
37 O.G. 3476 (1939).
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strikes are to be declared. Our courts have insisted on something
analogous to the doctrine of exhausting administrative remedies, by
requiring employees to exhaust available means of settling the dispute
without resort to strike. Strikes and other coercive acts are deemed
justified only when peaceful alternatives have proved unfruitful in
settling the dispute.,""
Lastly, for a strike to be lawful, it is also required that the means
used be lawful. This precludes resort to any unlawful act or conduct
in carrying out the strike. A strike was found illegal where the find-
ings of the CIR showed not only the commission of acts of sabotage
against the property of the employer, but also the employment of
violence against workers who remained loyal to the company and
refused to join the strike." 8
Injunctions and contracts. To the above limitations, we should
add injunctions as well as contractual restrictions. Under the act,
concerted activities, including strikes, are immunized, as a rule, against
injunctions and restraining orders. 99 There are situations, however,
when injunctions are authorized. For example, where the strike
involves no labor disputes,"' or where the exceptional circumstance
set forth in the act itself in section 9 (d) have been shown according
to the prescribed procedures,5"' and when the CIR acquires jurisdic-
tion over a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration. 0 2
A strike may be enjoined if connected with a labor dispute certified
to the CIR under the act,50" under the Minimum Wage Law,50' or
under the statute authorizing the operation of public utilities disrupted
or threatened with disruption by a labor dispute. 55 The CIR injuction
may forbid the employees to declare a strike if they are still at work
497 PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095, & Cia. Maritima v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 31, 1957); Interwood Employees Ass'n v.
International Hardwood & Veneer Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-7409 (May 18, 1956);
Union of PECO Employees v. PECO, Gen. Reg. No. L-4423 (March 31, 1952);
INSUREFCO Employees Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-7594 & L-7596 (Sept. 8,
1954) ; Citizens Labor Union v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Gen. Reg. No. .-7478 (May
6, 1955); Almeda v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-7425 (July 21, 1955); NLU v. Philip-
pine Match Factory, 70 Phil. 300 (1940).
498 NLU v. CIR, 70 Phil. 300 (1940).
409R.A. No. 875, § 9(a) (1) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 41(a)(1) (1956).
500 R.A. No. 875, § 11 (1953), as amended, PHil. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 43 (1956).
60 E.g., United Pepsi Cola Sales Corp. v. Canizares, Gen. Reg. No. L-12294 (Jan.
23, 1958).5021ndustrial Peace Act § 10; C.A. No. 103, § 19 (1936), PHl. ANN. LAWS tit.
42, § 22 (1956).505 R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 42 (1956).
5°1R.A. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), PHiL ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 78(c) (1956).
50 C.A. No. 358, § 1 (1938), PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 62, § 3, (1957).
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at the time the writ issues,"' or it may require them to return to
work within a prescribed period and to refrain from striking until
further orders of the court.507
The general rule on waiver of rights applies to the right to strike.
A waiver usually arises from a no-strike clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, or a provision therein expressly providing for
conclusive arbitration of grievances." 8
Reinstatement of strikers. The effect of a strike upon the employ-
ment relation between strikers and the employer is determined by
the legality of the strike, the absence of misconduct on the part of
particular strikers, the nature of the strike, and the intervention of
the CIR in the exercise of its power of compulsory arbitration.
Under certain circumstances, strikers have the right to reinstate-
ment, enjoyment of previous privileges, and backpay during the
strike. Reinstatement is usually granted where the strike is declared
against an unfair labor practice, which is later established as having
been committed by the employer and as having motivated the strike,"'°
where the strike, although merely economic, comes under the juris-
diction of the CIR to compulsorily arbitrate, and the CIR finds such
strike to be lawful and proper.51° Thus, where an employer mistakenly
discharged members of a minority union, upon demand of the majority
union with whom a closed shop agreement had been executed, and
the minority union declared a strike as a result of the dismissals, the
strike was directed at an unfair labor practice and the striking unionists
were entitled to reinstatement. 1' Further, where the CIR orders a
reinstatement, whether in an unfair labor practice case or in the
exercise of its power of compulsory arbitration under C.A. No. 103
in relation to section 10 of the act, it has the power to order the
discharge of replacements or strike-breakers who have been hired
by the employer. 12
5 06 E.g,. GSIS Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18734 (Dec. 30, 1961).
507 E.g., PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).
508 INSUREFCO Employees Union v. INSUREFCO & INSUREFCO v. CIR,
Gen. Reg. Nos. L-7594 & L-7596 (Sept. 8, 1954); Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine
Can Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-4834 (March 28, 1952).
50Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30, 1964);
Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-15447-48 (Jan. 31, 1962);
Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. 1-7228 (Nov. 29, 1955).
510 E.g., Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13364 (July 26, 1960).
511 Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-15447-8 (Jan. 31, 1962).
Also, Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept 30, 1964).
512 Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-15447-8 (Jan. 31, 1962)
(unfair labor practice case); Radio Operators Ass'n v. PHILMAROA, Gen. Reg.
No. L-10112 (Nov. 29, 1957); National City Bank of New York v. NCBNY Employ-
ees Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-6843 (Jan. 31, 1956) (compulsory arbitration cases).
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Reinstatement, however, may not be ordered where the particular
employee was engaged in misconduct during the strike;51 or where
the business has passed into the hand of a transferee who acted in
good faith;"' and where the need for the services of the striking
employees has ceased to exist, as where the employer has suffered
business reverses. 5
It must be stressed, however, that if the strike is merely economic
or is not an unfair labor practice strike, and the dispute is not certified
to the CIR for compulsory arbitration, no remedy for reinstatement
lies as a matter of course. The rule in such cases is that the employer
has a right to hire permanent replacements for the strikers, leaving
the strikers in the position of new applicants for new employment.
The only right they may insist on is that there be no discrimination
in re-hiring on the basis of union affiliation, and that there be no
discrimination for having engaged in a strike. 1
Back wages. As a rule, strikers are not entitled to backpay for the
strike period. This rule is founded on the principle of a "fair day's
wage for a fair day's labor."5 7 There are exceptional situations, how-
ever, where backpay may be awarded. Where the strikers taking part
in an unfair labor practice strike unconditionally offer to return to
work and the employer denies reinstatement without justification, the
employer is liable for damages."' However, where an offer to return
was made subject to employer compliance with the existing contract,
the offer to return was held conditional, and the employer was not
liable for back wages."' Nevertheless, in the exercise of its powers of
compulsory arbitration, the CIR may award back wages to strikers.40
Remedies of employer. In addition to denying reinstatement to
513 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30, 1964)
(unfair labor practice strike); National Organization of Laborers & Employees v.
Roldan, Gen. Reg. No. L-6888 (Aug. 31,1954); Union of PECO Employees v. PECO,
Gen. Reg. No. L-7161 (May 19, 1955); Connell Bros. v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-3631
(June 30, 1956) (economic strikes).514 Fernando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962);
Insular Sugar Refining Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19247 (May 31, 1963).515 In compulsory arbitration cases: Connell Bros. v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-3631
(June 30, 1956) ; Union of PECO Employees v. PECO, Geun. Reg. No. 1-7161 (May
19, 1955). Unfair labor practice cases: Columbia Rope Factory & Officers v. Tacloban
Ass'n of Laborers & Employees, Gen. Reg. No. L-14848 (Oct. 31, 1962).
516 Cf. Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30, 1964).51 7 Manila Trading Supply Co. v. Manila Trading Labor Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No.
L-5062 (April 27, 1953) ; J. P. Heilbrohn Co. v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-5121 (Jan.
30, 1953).
518 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Feb. 26, 1965). Also
PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095 & Cia. Maritima v. PHILMAROA,
Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 1957).
519 Ibid.5 2 0 Macleod v. Progressive Fed, of Labor, Gen. Reg. No. L-7887 (May 31, 1955).
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employees engaged in an unlawful strike,"' or in unlawful conduct,"
the employer may further avail of the following remedies: (1) action
for damages against the union and the striking employees;5 . (2)
injunction suits in certain cases; 52. (3) contempt proceedings, if the
strike was violative of an existing injunction;"'5 (4) a temporary
back-to-work order in cases pending before the CIR compulsory
arbitration proceeding;5 and (5) criminal suits for criminal acts
performed by the strikers. 7
Picketing. It is settled that peaceful picketing is a form of con-
stitutionally protected free speech. 8 In the language of the Supreme
Court, "peaceful picketing is a part of the freedom of speech guar-
anteed by the Constitution..5 5  Under the act, picketing is shielded
from injunction, as one of the acts declared unenjoinable is "giving
publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any method not
involving fraud or violence. 5.. Likewise made immune under the
act is "advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence, the acts heretofore specified." '' Applying these
rules, the Supreme Court has held that peaceful picketing could not
be enjoined, notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee
relationship, 3 ' or the existence of an unlawful labor objective. 3
By a special statute, the protection of criminal law is extended to
521 Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-4834; NLU v. CIR,
70 Phil. 300 (1940).
522 Cromwell Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19778 (Sept. 30, 1964).
Also, Union of PECO Employees v. PECO, Gen. Reg. No. L-4423 (March 31, 1952).
523 Under article 28 of the Cizil Code which states:
Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in
labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person
who thereby suffers damage. Also seePHIL. CiVn CODE arts. 20-21.
524R.A. No. 875, § 9(d) & § 10 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, §§
41(d) & 42 (1956).
525 For the CIR, C.A. No. 103, § 6 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42,
§ 9 (1956), and R.A. No. 875, § 5(e) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42,
§ 37(e) (1956) ; for the regular courts, PHIL. R. CT. 64.
526 C.A. No. 103, § 19 (1936), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 22 (1956);
R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 42 (1956).
527 Under the REv. PENAL CODE.
528 Mortera v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-1340 (Oct. 13, 1947).
529 Ibid.
530 R.A. No. 875, § 9(a) (5) (1953), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, §
41(a) (5) 1956).
53. R.A. No. 875, § 9(a) (9) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, §
41(a) (9) (1956).
582 De Leon v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-7586 (Jan. 30, 1957); Cruz v. Cinema,
Stage & Radio Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No. L-9581 (July 31, 1957).
53s Cruz v. Cinema, Stage & Radio Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9581 (July 31, 1957).
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picketing.""4 Under this law, willful obstruction or interference with
peaceful picketing by workers and/or employees during any labor
controversy; and knowingly aiding or abetting such obstruction or
interference"'3 are criminal offenses. The law, however, contemplates
obstruction or interference "in a manner not otherwise provided for
by existing law." This implies that if the interference or misconduct
falls into any of the categories of criminal conduct punished by exist-
ing penal laws, the unlawful act should be proceeded against on the
basis of such laws.
Like a strike, picketing may be unlawful if its aim or purpose is
unlawful. It has been held that the purpose of picketing was unlawful
where its object was to compel the new operator of an enterprise in
which the picketers had been formerly employed, to discharge em-
ployees in order to re-hire picketers. 3 An injunction issued against
unlawful acts in the course of picketing does not violate constitutional
rights.' 7
Lockouts. While the strike and picketing constitute the weapons
of labor in industrial conflicts, management has the lockout with
which to support its bargaining position or to counter with as a
defensive measure to union tactics. As with concerted activities, its
use is a privilege which is subject to restrictions.
Situations in which the cessation of employment or work was taken
on the initiative of the employer have been deemed lockouts. The
alleged termination of employment by the transfer of premises leased
by the employer, to another lessee, was held to constitute a lockout
within the meaning of this term as used in section 13 of the act, where
the transfer was fictitious and the employer as well as the new lessee
represented the same interest. Where regular employees of a company
were told that work would be stopped for two weeks for the taking
534 R.A. No. 1167 (1954), PHI. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 62 (1956).
535 R.A. No. 1167, § 1 (1954), PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 62 (1956); R.A. No.
3600 supplements the protection thus provided with the following provisions:
Hereafter, it shall be unlawful for any employer to employ any strike breaker,
or for any person to be knowingly employed as a strike breaker.
Strike breaker shall mean any person knowingly employed for the purpose of
obstructing or interfering by force or threats peaceful picketing by employees
during any labor controversy affecting wages, hours or conditions of labor; or the
exercise by employees of any of the rights of self organization or collective bar-
gaining.
536 Cruz v. Cinema, Stage & Radio Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9581 (July 31, 1957).
537 Young Men Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb. 26,
1965).
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of an inventory and that they would be notified when work was to
be resumed, it was held that "there was to them, for all practical
purposes, a lockout," '' when upon return of the employees after
the inventory was over, they were prevented from resuming work.
It was not necessary that the lockout be directed against a union or
union activities or that the real reason for it be known; it is enough
if the work stoppage was on the initiative of the employer." 9 Where
in response to a union's demands to improve labor conditions, a com-
pany sent letters of dismissal to thirty-eight members of the union,
it was held that "by its notice of separation the company practically
locked out its employees thus forcing them to call a strike.""5 ° When
a jeepney operator refused to allow his drivers to use his jeeps upon
learning of their union activity, the result was likewise held a lock-
out. " '
All work stoppages, however, whether on the initiative of the
employer or not, are not necessarily lockouts. It has been held that
there was no lockout where the lay-off of workers was due to the
good faith closure of a department of the company, even though the
closing took place after the court had awarded the employees a general
wage increase, as well as sick and vacation leaves with pay. 4'
Bargaining lockouts may follow a breakdown in contract negotia-
tions in the absence of a contract or following the termination of a
contract. In such a case, management may resort to a lockout if the
following requisites are satisfied: the employer has already bargained
collectively with the representative of his employees; complied with
the notice and waiting requirements imposed by the act; and the
lockout is not discriminatory."4
The act forbids an employer "to declare a lockout without having
first bargaining collectively with the representative of his employees
in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 5" In addition, the
act requires that before an employer may lockout his employees, he
must file with the Conciliation Service thirty days before the lockout
638 Sta. Mesa Slipways & Engineering Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-4521 (Aug.
18, 1952).
539 Ibid.
540 Macleod v. Progressive Fed. of Labor, Gen. Reg. No. L-7887 (May 31, 1955).
541 Dinglasan v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-14183 (Nov. 28, 1959).54 2 Chuan v. Nahag, Gen. Reg. No. L-7201 & Nahag v. Chuan, Gen. Reg. No. L-7211
(Sept. 22, 1954).
543 R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 47 (1956);
San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962) ; Rizal Cement
Workers Union v. Madrigal Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-19767 (April 30, 1964).
544 R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 47 (1956).
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takes place, a notice of intention to stage a lockout. The notice shall
be in a form prescribed by the chief of the Conciliation Service. 541
Where the lockout is designed to compel modification or termination
of an existing agreement, the following requisites must appear in order
for a lockout to be lawful: (1) that the contract is by its terms
subject to modification or termination during its lifetime, whether
definite or indefinite; (2) that a written notice of the proposed termina-
tion or modification has been served upon the contracting union; (3)
that the notice is given at least thirty days prior to the expiration
date of the agreement, or in the absence of an express provision con-
cerning the period of validity, at least thirty days prior to the time
the termination or modification is intended to have effect; (4) the
employer has already bargained collectively with the representative
of his employees; and (5) notice of an intention to lockout his em-
ployees has been served on the Conciliation Service at least 30 days
before the lockout." 6
It remains an open question whether after having satisfied these
statutory requisites, an employer may initiate a lockout without
discrimination once a bargaining impasse has come about, with the
same privilege that a union may resort to a bargaining strike. 47 Where
a strike declared in a cement factory involved acts of sabotage, it
was held that the employer was justified in declaring a lockout at
its warehouse in order to prevent the possibility of similar acts by
warehouse employees who belong to the striking union. 48
The right to lockout is subject to virtually the same limitations
as the right to strike, particularly: lawful purpose, lawful means,
valid injunctions, statutory requirements, and contractual limitations.
A lockout is tainted with an unlawful purpose, insofar as the act is
concerned, where any of the following objectives are contemplated:
the frustration of union activities or organizational efforts; 9 the
destruction or undermining of bargaining representation; 550 and the
evasion of the duty to bargain.551
545 ILA. No. 875, § 14(d) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 46(d)
(1956).(55)1A. No. 875, §§ 13, 14(d) & 15 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42,
§§ 45, 46(d) & 47 (1956).54 7 See cases cited note 543 supra.548 Rizal Cement Workers Union v. Madrigal Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-19767 (April
30, 1964).549 Dinglasan v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-14183 (Nov. 28, 1959).510 San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962). Also
NLRB v. Anchorage Businessman's Ass'n, 289 F.2d 619.
551 Fernando v. Angat Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17896 (May 30, 1962).
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Where the lockout amounts to an unfair labor practice, in that
it constitutes a violation of the duty to bargain collectively, reinstate-
ment will be ordered by the CIR under the act.5 In addition, the
act prescribes that "any employee whose work has stopped as a
consequence of such lockout shall be entitled to back-pay."5"3 How-
ever, even where the lockout is established as an unfair labor practice,
reinstatement may not be accompanied with backpay for the entire
period of work stoppage. The award of backpay may be mitigated
by the good faith of the employer guilty of the lockout, " " or by the
unjustified refusal of the locked out workers to return to work after
the employer had already indicated his willingness to re-admit them."5
This makes it clear that locked out employees have a duty to return
to work as soon as the employer is willing to re-admit them on the
same terms as before the lockout.
In addition, backpay owing to locked out employees may be reduced
by any amounts which they may have earned in the meantime.5" It
is essential for recovery of backpay for unlawful lockout, that an
award be made. " But backpay has been allowed although the order
of reinstatement contained no award for backpay where the union
seasonably moved to question the omission before the order had
become final. 5"
INJUNCTIONS
Requirements for valid writ. In order for the restrictions imposed
by section 9 of the act to apply, an injunction must be sought in a
"case involving or growing out of a labor dispute," and against "any
person or persons participating or interested in such dispute.""55 The
restrictions imposed by the act on the issuance of injunctions include
limitations on the person or persons entitled to relief;5"' the person
or persons against whom relief is available;56' the conduct enjoin-
552 See notes 549 & 550 supra.
558 R.A. No. 875, § 15 (1953), as amended, Prim. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 47 (1956).
'
5 4 Cf. Allied Workers Ass'n v. PLASLU, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-15447-48 (Jan. 31,
1962).
555 Dinglasan v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-14183 (Nov. 28, 1959).
556 Macleod v. Progressive Fed. of Labor, Gen. Reg. No. L-7887 (May 31, 1955).
557 San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962).559 San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (April 30, 1962).
655R.A. No. 875, § 9(f) (1953), as amended, PaI. ANN. LAws tit. 42 § 41(f)
(1956).
560R.A. No. 875, § 9(e) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 41(e)
(1956).561 R.A. No. 875, § 9(c) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 41(c)
(1956).
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able; 2 the procedures in the issuance of the injunction;18  and the
scope of the injunctions.64
It has been held that picketing cannot be enjoined except under
the restrictions imposed by section 9 of the act, even though the
aim or purpose of the concerted activity is wrongful or illegal.55
Similarly, a strike declared in violation of an agreement to resolve
a dispute between two labor unions through peaceable means was
protected by the injunction ban imposed under the act as involving
a question of representation, and therefore a "labor dispute." ' In
a recent case a threatened strike to enforce bargaining demands was
held to grow out of a labor dispute and hence was unenjoinable, not-
withstanding the allegation that it would be in contravention of the
notice-and-waiting requirements of the act and thus unlawful. 6 The
exceptions to this immunity from injunction or restraining order are
labor disputes subject to compulsory arbitration,58 tortious conduct
arising from or growing out of labor disputes, such as fraud or
violence,"'8 and, acts constituting unfair labor practices.'
Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction to issue an injunction in labor dis-
putes is a vexing question. Nevertheless, certain guiding principles
may be stated. Where the injunction is directed at conduct connected
with, incidental to, or involving a labor dispute which is pending
resolution in some court, then the injunctive relief is merely auxiliary,
and the court which has jurisdiction over the main or principal case
has jurisdiction over the auxiliary matter." 1 On the basis of this
principle, the CIR had jurisdiction to grant injunctions where the
acts sought to be enjoined arose in connection with concerted, activities
562R.A. No. 875, § 9(a) (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 41(a)
(1956).
956 A. No. 875, § 9(d) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 41(d)
(1956).
564R.A. No. 875, § 9(f) (1953), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 41(f)
(1956).
65 Cruz v. Cinema, State & Radio Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9581 (July 31, 1957).
166 Balaquezon Trans. Labor Union v. Mufioz Palma, Gen. Reg. No. L-12587 (Nov.
27, 1959).567 Caltex Refinery Employees Ass'n v. Lucero, Gen. Reg. No. L-15338 (April 28,
1962).
568R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 42 (1956).
560 R.A. No. 875, § 9(d) (1953), as amended, PHI. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 41(d)
(1956); Young Man Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb.
26, 1965).
570 R.A. No. 875, § 5(a) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWs tit. 42, § 37(a)
(1956).
571 PAFLU v. Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-9115 (Aug. 31, 1956) ; Cueto v. Ortiz, Gen.
Reg. No. L-11555 (May 31, 1960).
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or other conduct provoked by unfair labor practices." 2 For ancillary
jurisdiction to attach to the CIR, it is enough that the acts sought
to be enjoined arose in connection with concerted activities directed
at or provoked by employer conduct constituting a prima facie unfair
labor practice or practices."' This is so, regardless of whether an
unfair labor practice proceeding has been instituted for such acts."
Apart from conduct connected with acts shown prima facie to be
unfair labor practices, the CIR also has ancillary jurisdiction when
the acts sought to be enjoined grow out of, or are connected with, a
labor dispute which has been certified to the CIR for compulsory
arbitration under section 10 of the act,5"5 or under the Minimum
Wage Law."' In such a case, any existing jurisdiction which the
regular courts may have acquired is abated and the incidental jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions pertains to the CIR 7
However, where an unfair labor practice suit is filed in bad faith,
without regard to the facts but merely for the purpose of divesting
the regular courts of jurisdiction, the rule is that jurisdiction over the
labor dispute still pertains to the regular courts.7 Where the subject
matter of the labor dispute does not pertain to the CIR but pertains
to the regular courts, it is settled that the regular courts have jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctions and restraining orders.7 Such issuance,
572 NARIC Workers Union v. Alvendia, Gen. Reg. No. L-14439 (March 25, 1960) ;
Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. v. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Ass'n (NATU), Gen.
Reg. No. L-11907 (June 24, 1958).
67- GSIS Employees Ass'n v. Alvendia, Gen. Reg. No. L-15514 (May 30, 1960);
Associated Labor Union v. Rodriguez, Gen. Reg. No. 16672 (Oct. 31, 1960) ; NARIC
Workers Union v. Alvendia, Gen. Reg. No. L-14439 (March 25, 1960); Balaquezon
Trans. Labor Union v. Mufioz Palma, Gen. Reg. No. L-12587 (Nov. 27, 1959) ; Lakas
ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. Victoriano, Gen. Reg. No L-9290 (Jan 14, 1958);
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Coto Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12000 (Aug.
30, 1958); Consolidated Labor Ass'n v. Caluag, Gen. Reg. No. L-12530 (May 30,
1958); Associated Watchmen & Security Union v. Macadaeg, 54 Off. Gaz. 7397;
Erlanger & Glainger Inc. v. National Ass'n of Trade Unions, Gen. Reg. No. L-11907
(June 24, 1958); SMB Box Factory Workers Union v. Victoriano, Gen. Reg. No.
L-12820 (Dec. 20, 1957) ; National Garments & Textiles Workers Union v. Caluag,
Gen. Reg. No. L-9104 (Sept. 10, 1956); Fil-Hispano Labor Union v. Montesa, Gen.
Reg. No. L-18371 (April 23, 1963).
5T4 Consolidated Labor Ass'n v. Caluag, Gen. Reg. No. L-12530 (May 30, 1958).
575 Including strikes and lockouts.
576 RA. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), as amended, Pa.. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 78
(1956).577 Rizal Cement Co. v. Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12747 (July 30, 1960).
578 NARIC Workers Union v. Alvendia, Gen. Reg. No. L-14439 (March 25, 1960);
Consolidated Labor Ass'n v. Caluag, Gen. Reg. No. L-12530 (May 30, 1958).
579 Cueto v. Ortiz, Gen. Reg. No. L-11555 (May 31, 1960) ; National Ass'n of Trade
Unions v. Bayona, Gen. Reg. No. L-2940 (April 17, 1959) ; United Pepsi Cola Sales
Corp. v. Canizares, Gen. Reg. No. L-12294 (Jan. 23, 1958); Allied Free Workers
Union v. Apostol, Gen. Reg. No. L-8876 (Oct. 31, 1957) ; Cruz v. Cinema, State &
Radio Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No. L-9581 (July 31, 1957) ; PAFLU
v. Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-9115 (Aug. 31, 1956); PAFLU v. Barot, Gem Reg. No.
L-9281 (Sept. 28, 1956).
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however, is subject to the requirements of section 9 of the act. " '
When an injunction is sought in any court, the burden is on the
party claiming absence of jurisdiction to show the same. It has been
held that where a petition for an injunction is filed with the regular
courts and the petition is opposed on the ground that the CIR has
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, the opposing party must show
that the acts sought to be enjoined are connected with the unfair labor
practice case pending in the CIR.5 11
Procedure. The act imposes strict procedural requirements for
the issuance of injunctions and restraining orders. These include a
verified complaint; notice to the respondents, except in highly excep-
tional cases; hearing of testimony; the finding of jurisdictional facts
required by the act; the filing of the findings of fact in the record
of the case; and filing of the required bond. "2
The act authorizes an ex parte restraining order upon compliance
with the following additional requisites: (1) the complaint must
allege that (unless a temporary restraining order will issue without
notice) a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will be unavoidable; (2) a hearing must be held at which testimony
under oath must be given in support of the allegations in the com-
plaint; and (3) that, if sustained, the testimony will be sufficient to
justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after
notice." '
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
Arbitration under the act. Under the act, compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes lies in the following cases: labor disputes affecting
580 PAFLU v. Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-9115 (Aug. 31, 1956); PAFLU v. Barot,
Gen. Reg. No. L-9281 (Sept. 28, 1956).
581 United Pepsi Cola Sales Corp v. Canizares, Gen. Reg. No. L-12294 (Jan. 24,
1958).
582R.A. No. 875, § 9(d) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 41(d)
(1956). National Ass'n of Trade Unions v. Bayona, Gen. Reg. No. L-12940 (April
17, 1959); Balaquezon Trans. Labor Union v. Muiioz Palma, Gen. Reg. No. L-12587
(Nov. 27, 1959) ; Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul v. Victoriano, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9290 (Jan. 14, 1958); Benguet Consol. Mining Co. v. Coto Labor Union, Gen.
Reg. No. L-12000 (Aug. 30, 1958) ; National Garments & Textile Workers Union v.
Cauag, Gen. Reg. No. L-9104 (Sept. 10, 1956) ; Natioral Mines & Allied Workers
Union v. Ilao, Gen. Reg. No. L-16884 (Jan. 31, 1963); SMB Box Factory WorkersUnion v. Victoriano, Gen. Reg. No. L-12820 (Dec. 20, 1957).
82 Ibid. Requisites compied with: United Pepsi Cola Sales Corp. v. Canizares,
Ge. Reg. No. L-12294 (Jan. 23, 1958). Requisites not compied with: Balaquezon
Trans. Labor Union v. Muiioz Palma, Gen. Reg. No. L-12587 (Nov. 27, 1959);
Allied Free Workers v. Apostol, Gen. Reg. No. L-8876 (Oct. 31, 1957); Reyes v. Tan,
Gen Reg. No. L-9137 (Aug. 31, 1956).
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an industry indispensable to the national interest; 58' labor disputes
where the demands of minimum wages involve an actual strike;5..
where a dispute case before the CIR involves as the sole issue, or
as one of the issues, a dispute as to minimum wages above the applica-
ble statutory minimum; 586 and any dispute which involves a question
as to the hours of employment. 87
Under section 10 of the act, compulsory arbitration lies "when in
the opinion of the President there exists a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to the national interest and when such labor dispute
is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations.... ."'
Among the controversies deemed "labor disputes" have been pro-
posed salary standardization provisions in a collective agreement;58
economic demands of a minority union which had just lost a certifica-
tion election;59° demands for overtime and holiday pay, for differen-
tials under the Minimum Wage Law, for restoration of reduced pay
rates, and for reinstatement of employees unjustly dismissed; 59 unfair
labor practices committed against the members of a union;592 demands
for recognition of a picketing union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of security watchmen employed aboard ocean going vessels
while in the port of Manila;595 unfair labor practices arising out of
discriminatory dismissals of employees who had filed charges under
the act;5. demands for reinstatement of dismissed employees with
backpay, hospitalization privileges, and sick leave with pay;59 5 de-
mands for a closed shop agreement, plus economic benefits including
standardization and increase of salaries, sick and vacation leaves with
pay, and hospitalization privileges.'
Among labor disputes which have been deemed to have taken place
"in an industry indispensable to the national interest" are those affect-
ing enterprises involving overland transportation,597 manufacturing,
584R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 72 (1956).
58 R.A. No. 602, § 16(c), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 78 (1956).
586 R.A. No. 622, § 16(b), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 78 (1956).
587 R.A. No. 875, § 7 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 39 (1956).
588 R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 42 (1956).
859 GSIS Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18734 (Dec. 30, 1961).
590 PASUDECO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13178 (March 25, 1961).
591 Hindu Sugar Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13364 (July 26, 1960).
5 9 2 Rizal Cement Co. v. Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12747 (July 30, 1960).
593 US Lines v. Associated Watchmen & Security Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12208
(May 21, 1958).
594 PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).
595 PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095 & Cia. Maritima v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 31, 1957).
596 Bisaya Land Trans. Co., Inc., v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10114 (Nov. 26, 1957).
597 PANTRANCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-9736 (May 20, 1957).
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such as sugar'1s and cement,"' communications,"' electrical power,"'
gas and oil distribution,0 2 insurance and retirement programs for pub-
lic employees,"0 3 and foreign shipping.'" The finding that the "indus-
try" affected is indispensable to the national interest rests upon the
sound discretion of the President which will not be reviewed in the
absence of clear abuse.605
The certification of the dispute to the CIR may be made by the
President or by a representative directed to act in his behalf. Where
the request for certification of a labor dispute presented by the man-
ager of a government corporation was approved by the President by an
appropriate indication above his signature on the letter transmitting
the request, a certification of the dispute to the CIR by the executive
secretary "by authority of the President" was held valid and effective,
notwithstanding the absence of the President from Manila at the time
as well as the lack of mention of the certification in that portion of the
Official Gazette chronicling the events in the President's day. The
decision rests in part on the silence of the statute as to the form in
which the certification is to be made to the CIR.606
As a result of certification, the CIR acquires jurisdiction over the
labor dispute for compulsory arbitration,07 and by abatement, juris-
diction over the same labor dispute, or incidents thereof, which any
other court has acquired is withdrawn, displaced or divested. 08 In
resolving the labor dispute, the CIR may avail itself of all the powers
granted by C.A. No. 103, as amended,0 9 including the power to order
the dismissal of replacements hired to perform the jobs of reinstated
strikers."'
Under the Minimum Wage Law. Under the Minimum Wage Law,
wage disputes may be taken cognizance of by the CIR for compulsory
arbitration: (1) in the event that a dispute case before the CIR in-
rg PASUDECO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13178 (March 25, 1961).
r90 Rizal Cement Co. v. Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12747 (July 30, 1960).600 Free Telephone Workers Union v. PLDT, C. I. R. Case No. 2-IPA.
601 NLU v. MERALCO, C. I. R. Case No. 7-IPA.
602 Philippine Labor Organization v. Caltex, C. I. R. Case No. 5-IPA.
60O GSIS Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18734 (Dec. 30, 1961).604 US Lines v. Associated Watchmen & Security Union, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-12208,
L-12209-11 (May 21, 1958).60 PASUDECO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13178 (March 25, 1961).
960 GSIS Employees Ass'n v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18734 (Dec. 30, 1961).
07 Industrial Peace Act § 10.608 Rizal Cement Co. v. Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-12747 (July 30, 1960).609 PHILMAROA v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-10095 & Cia. Maritima v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-10115 (Oct. 31, 1957) ; Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg.
No. L-13364 (July 26, 1960).
610 Ibid.
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volves as the sole issue, or as one of the issues, a dispute concerning a
minimum wage above the applicable statutory minimum,"'1 and (2)
when the demands for minimum wages involve an actual strike,
which is not settled by conciliation."'
In the first case, it is clear that the wage dispute is connected with
a case over which the CIR has already acquired jurisdiction for com-
pulsory arbitration. This situation is possible only where a labor dis-
pute is certified to the CIR under section 10 of the act, and this dispute
involves, either as the sole issue or one of the issues, a dispute over
minimum wages above the applicable statutory minimum. The CIR
may act on the wage dispute if the industry concerned involves only
one enterprise or employer (who is consequently a party to the dis-
pute), or if no wage order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor
for the industry to which the affected enterprise belongs. It is thus
clear that an existing wage order for the industry of which the enter-
prise affected is a part precludes an award for minimum wages by
the CIR. The remedy is to petition the Secretary of Labor."'
In the second case, the requisites for CIR jurisdiction are an exist-
ing dispute over minimum wages which precipitates an actual strike.
The Secretary of Labor must have failed to effect a settlement by con-
ciliation within the period prescribed by law, and have certified the
dispute to the CIR as a matter of statutory duty. Upon certification,
the CIR acquires jurisdiction to act on the dispute.61
The law is not clear as to what is "a dispute over minimum wages."
Three types of disputes appear to be included: disputes as to which of
the minimum wage rates prescribed by the law or wage order applies to
the employees concerned; 15 disputes involving demands for minimum
wages above the applicable statutory minimum;' 6 and disputes over
alleged underpayments." 7 While the first two are clearly appropriate
for arbitration, the third type of dispute, which involves alleged under-
payments, does not pose an arbitrable question. Clearly, the aggrieved
611 R.A. No. 602, § 16(b) (1951), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 78(a)
(1956).
612 R.A. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 78(c)
(1956).
613 R.A. No. 602, § 4 (1951), as amended, PHiL.. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 66 (1956).
614 Benguet Consol. v. Coto Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17202 (April 29, 1961).
615 This may happen in the case of employees alleged to be agricultural laborers
who claim to be industrial workers (R.A. No. 602, § 3 (1951), as amended, Pa..
ANN. LAWS tit 42, § 65 (1956) and employees alleged to come within the special rates
fixed by the law (R.A. No. 602, § 9 (1951), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42,
§ 71 (1956).
616 See note 614 supra.
617R.A. No. 602, § 16(a) (1951), as amended, Pum. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 78
(1956) ; People v. Gatchalian, Gen. Reg. No. L-12011 (Sept. 30, 1958).
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employee or employees have adequate remedies. They may request the
Secretary of Labor to press their claims for unpaid wages through
mediators or conciliators,18 and if this proves unsuccessful, they may
resort to the courts either through the Secretary of Labor," 9 or by
themselves.62 Criminal suits may even be brought against the em-
ployer. 2' In view of this ample opportunity for redress, collection
should not be countenanced through a strike, followed by conciliation
and arbitration. If this were allowed, employees could easily force a
resort to arbitration by striking, instead of utilizing the peaceful rem-
edies provided by law.
Where the Secretary of Labor in his certification of a labor dispute
concerning minimum wages has clearly defined the issues to be resolved
by the CIR, it is not essential that formal pleadings by way of com-
plaint and answer be filed. In this type of case, the matter should be
set immediately for hearing either before the court itself or before a
judge, who may report to the CIR en banc for its consideration and
deliberation. 22
For the most part, voluntary arbitration is governed by statute,
known as the Arbitration Law.622 This is supplemented by the provi-
sions of the Civil Code,62 plus general principles adopted by our Su-
preme Court to meet Philippine conditions.625
THE CouRT oF INDUSTRiAL RELATIONS
The CIR in general. The primary agency for the enforcement of
the Industrial Peace Act is the Court of Industrial Relations. While it
is similar to the NLRB in certain respects, the differences between the
two agencies are great and far-reaching, particularly as to the scope of
jurisdiction and the extent of authority. The CIR has a much broader
jurisdiction. In addition to unfair labor practices and representation
proceedings under the act, the CIR has jurisdiction over injunctions
involving labor disputes subject to its jurisdiction, compulsory arbitra-
tion of disputes certified to it, and claims for extra compensation under
6O1M nMru WAGE LAw, Code of Rules & Regs. art. 7.
619 R.A. No. 602, § 15(d) (1951), as amended, PHiL. Axx. LAws tit. 42, § 77
(1956).
620 R.A. No. 602, § 16(a) (1941), as amended, PH3L. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 78
(1956).121R. A. No. 602, § 15(a) (1951), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 77
(1956) ; People v. Tachallan, Gen. Reg. No. L-12011 (Sept. 30 1958)622 Benguet Consol. v. Coto Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-17202 (April 29, 1961).
323 R.A. No. 876 (1953), PH L. AxN. LAws tit. 6 (1956).
624 PHIL. Civi CODE arts. 2042-46.
625 5 ToLmxTixo, CIm CODE OF THE PHILI'PINS.
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certain conditions. The CIR has all the authority of the NLRB with
respect to unfair labor practice and representation proceedings and in
addition has the power to enforce and execute its own decisions."' In
compulsory arbitration disputes, the CIR exercises all the powers usu-
ally pertaining to an arbitration tribunal. 27
It is thus understandable why the CIR has been characterized as a
special tribunal,628 a special court,629 an administrative board,63 and a
court of justice.6 ' It has even been described as a "court of first in-
stance" with jurisdiction limited by the law creating it.2 Clearly, the
nature of the CIR is dependent upon the particular purpose for which
classification is sought. Insofar as it is the aim to relieve or free the
CIR from the passivity and technicalities which control the proceed-
ings of the regular courts of justice, the CIR has usually been held to
be an administrative agency or tribunal, and hence untrammelled by
the strict procedural rules applicable to ordinary courts. Where, how-
ever, the purpose is to subject the proceedings of the CIR to the fun-
damentals of due process, so as to protect substantial rights or to up-
hold a public policy, it has been considered as a "court" and hence
subject to the limitations of pertinent rules, including the Rules of
Court. In sum, the CIR is an arbitration tribunal when exercising its
jurisdiction to compulsorily arbitrate disputes; it is an administrative
agency when discharging its functions under the Industrial Peace Act;
and in both cases, it exercises broad authority, administrative as well
as judicial, including the inherent powers of the regular courts, but
subject also to the limitations of the pertinent statutes as well as of the
Constitution.
In the exercise of its statutory functions, the CIR is not subject to
the control of the regular courts. The Supreme Court has held that a
court of first instance may not prohibit the CIR from executing, by
appropriate writ, a final judgment requiring reinstatement with back
wages, or from availing of its contempt power for such purpose: "it
being well settled in this jurisdiction that the Court of Industrial Rela-
tions is equal in rank with the Courts of First Instance. 6..
626 C.A. No. 103, § 19 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 22 (1956).
627 See cases cited note 609 supra.6 2 8 Antamok Goldfields v. CIR, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
629 Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 639 (1939).
630 Ibid.
631 Metropolitan Trans. Serv. v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819 (1948).
6 3 2 UST Hospital Employees Ass'n v. St. Tomas University Hospital, Gen. Reg.
No. L-6988 (May 24, 1954).6 33 Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Calvag, Gen. Reg. No.
L-17692 (July 20, 1961).
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Organization of CIR. The business of the CIR is divided between
the court en banc and its branches. As in the courts of first instance,
each CIR judge presides over one of the five branches and acts on such
matters as the presiding judge may designate. He presides over the
hearing of cases and other matters assigned to him and renders deci-
sions thereon.""
As a rule, it is not required that cases before the CIR be disposed of
by the court en banc. It is enough that one judge acting as a trial court
hears and decides; his decision is that of the court. 35 There is, how-
ever, at least one exception: when a dispute over minimum wages in-
volving an actual strike is certified by the Secretary of Labor to the
CIR for compulsory arbitration, the Minimum Wage Law directs that
the "decision shall be rendered by the Court en banc .... .,638 Even in
this exceptional situation, however, it is not required that the court en
banc hear the case and receive the evidence. This function can be dele-
gated to one of the judges, who submits the record, together with his
findings, for reconsideration of the court en banc."8 7
On the other hand, the CIR en banc discharges two tasks: the ini-
tial disposition of cases when required by law; "I and the review of the
decisions or orders of each of the five judges when acting as a trial
court."'0 The review function of the court en banc comes into play,
when aggrieved parties appeal from the trial court's orders or decisions
by way of motions for reconsideration. Review of any order or deci-
sion by the court en banc may also be made upon the request of any of
the judges. This approach, however, is rarely used.
Once a matter requiring the action of the court en banc is presented,
it is not required that all five judges attend and participate in the con-
sideration and decision of the case; it is enough if a quorum obtains.
Under C.A. No. 103, "the concurrence of at least three of the five
judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order,
or award.. 64 In view of the statutory requirement, a quorum has been
634 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 7-8 (1936), as amended, PHix. ANN. LAws tit. 42, §
10, 11 (1956).
635 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 7 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
636R.A. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 78(c)
(1956); Benguet Consol. v. Coto Labor Union (NLU), Gen. Reg. No. L-17202
(April 29, 1961).637 Benguet Consol. v. Coto Labor Union (NLU), Gen. Reg. No. L-17202 (April
29, 1961).
638 See note 636 supra.
639 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 8 (1936), as amended, Pun.. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 4,
para. 8 (1956).
640 Ibid. It is not required that the three should agree on the issues or on the rea-
sons for their decision; their concurrence on a particular result is sufficient. Embassy
Motor Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18685 (Sept. 13, 1963).
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interpreted to mean at least three members of the CIR.4 1 A decision
signed by four judges was upheld against the contention that because
less than five judges took part in the consideration and resolution of
the case, the decision was null and void.642
One or more judges of the court of first instance may be designated
by the Secretary of Justice to sit temporarily as judge of the CIR
when the requisite quorum is not present because of illness, absence,
incapacity, temporary disability of any judge, a vacancy on the Court,
or where the voting results in a tie.6"3
Jurisdiction. Originally, under C.A. No. 103, the CIR was given
jurisdiction for purposes of mediation, conciliation, and compulsory
arbitration over all disputes throughout the Philippines arising between
employers and employees or laborers, and between landlords and ten-
ants or farm-laborers.644 Subsequently, under C.A. No. 461, the CIR
was also given jurisdiction over labor disputes in public utilities or
public service enterprises which have been taken over by the govern-
ment.645
Under present statutory and decisional law the CIR has jurisdiction
over the following cases: (1) unfair labor practice cases; 646 (2) labor
disputes affecting an industry indispensable to the national interest
which have been certified to the CIR by the President;4 7 (3) labor
disputes involving demands for minimum wages;64 ' (4) cases involving
hours of employment; 49 (5) labor disputes involving public utilities
which have been certified to the CIR by the President; 5 (3) labor
of or as incident to the aforementioned cases;6 ' (7) disputes concern-
ing the proper representation of employees; 52 (8) contempt proceed-
641 Embassy Motor Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18685 (Sept. 13,
196.3).6 42 Tolentino v. Angeles, Gen. Reg. No. 1-8150 (May 30, 1956).
643 C.A. No. 103, § 1, para. 9 (1936), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 4,
para. 9 (1956).6 4 4 Antamok Goldfields v. CIR, 70 Phil. 340 (1940) ; Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil.
635 (1939). CIR no longer has jurisdiction over landlord-tenant disputes. See R.A.
No. 1267, § 17 (June 14, 1955).
645 C.A. No. 461, § 1, para. 2, repealed, R.A. No. 1199, § 59 (1951).
6 46 Jornales v. Central Azucarera de Bais, Gen. Reg. No. L-15287 (Sept. 30, 1963)
and the cases therein cited.
647 R.A. No. 875, § 7 (1953), as amended, in relation to § 10, PHIL. ANN. LAws
tit. 42, § 39 (1956).
648 Compare R.A. No. 875, § 7 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, §
39 (1956) with R.A. No. 602, § 16(c) (1951), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, §
78 (1956).
649 R.A. No. 875, § 7 (1953), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 39 (1956).
650 See note 645 supra.
c5 See notes 572, 573 & 574 supra.
652 Young Men Labor Union Stevedores v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-20307 (Feb. 26,
1965).
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ings arising in connection with the above listed cases;65 and (9) cases
pending at the time of the enactment of the Industrial Peace Act.6 4
Reinstatement. Petitions for reinstatement come within the juris-
diction of the CIR when reinstatement is sought as a form of relief in
connection with unfair labor practices, either duly pleaded in the same
petition or already in court;655 when reinstatement is sought in connec-
tion with a labor dispute over which the court had already acquired
jurisdiction for compulsory arbitration through appropriate certifica-
tion under the Industrial Peace Act, 56 or under the Minimum Wage
Law;6 7 and when reinstatement is sought under an existing order or
award of the court, which is alleged to have been violated.5
Money benefits. Where money benefits are sought as incidental re-
lief, the CIR has jurisdiction to grant them in unfair labor practice
cases as backpay'll or as damages in the nature of or in addition to
backpay 6 ° Money benefits may also be granted in compulsory arbi-
tration cases pending under C.A. No. 103 or certified to it under the
Industrial Peace Act or the Minimum Wage Law6 ' and in overtime or
premium pay cases. 6
In all such cases, however, it must be alleged or shown with respect
to particular claimants that an employer-employee relationship is still
existing or is sought to be established or renewed. For example, if the
employee or employees claiming money benefits are still working for
653 C.A. No. 103, § 6 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 9 (1956)
and Industrial Peace Act § 5(e).
664 See note 657 infra.
05 NLU v. Insular-Yebana Tobacco Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-15363 (July 31, 1961).656 GSIS v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17186 & Olase v. GSIS, Gen. Reg. No. L-17363
(Oct. 31, 1961).(157 Benguet Consol. v. Coto Labor Union (NLU), Gen. Reg. No. L-17202 (April
29, 1961); INSUREFCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12108 (Sept. 29, 1959).658 Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-14023 & L-14135 (Jan. 30,
1960) ; NARIC v. Henson, Gen. Reg. No. L-15093 (July 30, 1960) ; Katipunan Labor
Union v. Caltex, Gen. Reg. No. 1-10337 (May 27, 1957) ; Caltex v. Datipunan Labor
Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-13918 (April 25, 1962).659 R.A. No. 875, § 5(c) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 37
(1956).660 See cases cited notes 359-61 supmra.661 National Dev. Co. v. Aralar, Gen. Reg. No. L-14258 (July 26, 1960) ; Hind
Sugar Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13364 (July 26, 1960).602 NAWASA v. NAWASA Consol. Unions, Gen. Reg. No. L-18938 (Aug. 31,
1964) ; MRR v. CIR, L-77871 (Jan. 31, 1964). Also Nassco v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-17068 (Dec. 30, 1961) ; PAN AM World Airways System v. PAN AM Employees
Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-16275 (Feb. 23, 1961); PRISCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-13806 (May 23, 1960); PRISCO v. PRISCO Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9288 (Dec. 29, 1958); Detective & Protective Bureau v. Guevarra, Gen. Reg. No.
L-8738 (May 31, 1957) ; Pampanga Sugar Mills v. PASUMIL Workers Union, Gen.
Reg. No. L-7668 (Feb. 29, 1956); Manila Terminal Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-4148 (July 16, 1952); Detective & Protective Bureau v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-04337 (Dec. 29, 1951) ; Elks Club v. Rovira, Gen. Reg. No. L-48411 (Feb. 24, 1948).
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the employer,6"' or if the claimant has not worked for the employer, he
may be entitled to be hired if he has been unlawfully discriminated
against by prior hiring practices.664 Where actual work for the em-
ployer has ceased, it must be shown that the employer-employee rela-
tionship is still subsisting, as in the case of strikers whose status is
pending adjudication by the CIR. 65 If the claimant or claimants have
been discharged, laid-off, locked out, or otherwise dismissed, and the
termination of relationship is wrongful, the employee or employees
concerned are entitled to reinstatement by the CIR.66
Matters excluded from CIR jurisdiction. The CIR is without juris-
diction over (1) the enforcement of employment contracts or collective
bargaining contracts;667 (2) the recovery of underpayments constitut-
ing violations of the Minimum Wage Law; 6 (3) simple money claims
arising out of past employment, such as separation pay, unpaid wages,
overtime and holiday pay, etc.;669 (4) reinstatement under statutes
other than the Industrial Peace Act or C.A. No. 103 ;670 (5) reinstate-
ment arising under an employment contract or collective bargaining
agreement; 6 (6) injunctions not arising out of or connected with a
663 Tiberio v. Manila Pilots' Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-17661 (Dec. 28, 1961) (allega-
tion that claimant was on sick leave); NDC v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15422 (Nov.
30, 1962); PRISCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13806 (May 23, 1960); PAN AM World
Airways System v. PAN AM Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-16275 (Feb. 23,
1961).664 R.A. No. 865, § 4(a) (4) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS, tit. 42, § 36
(1956).6 5 A. L. Anmnen Trans. Co. v. Borja, Gen. Reg. No. L-17750 (Aug. 31, 1962);
Dy v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17788 (May 25, 1962); Ajax Int'l Corp. v. Seguritan,
Gen. Reg. No. L-16038 (Oct. 25, 1960); Leduna v. Enriguez, Gen. Reg. No. L-13965
(May 23, 1960).6 66 Employees & Laborers Cooperative Ass'n v. National Union of Restaurant
Workers (PLUM), Gen. Reg. No. L-18697 (Feb. 28, 1963); Sterling Prods. Int'l
Inc. v. Sol & CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19187 (Feb. 28, 1963).
667 National Mines & Allied Workers v. Philippine Iron Mines, Gen. Reg. No.
L-19372 (Oct. 31, 1964); Elizalde Paint & Oil Factory v. Bautista, Gen. Reg. No.
L-15904 (Nov. 23, 1960); Philippine Sugar Institute v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13098(Oct. 29, 1959); Dee Cho Lumber Workers Union v. Dee Cho Lumber Co., 55 Off.
Gaz. (19 ). This extends to enforcement of check-off authorization, Oriental Tin
Cans Workers v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17695 (Feb. 26, 1965).
668 Magdalena Estate v. Bangilan, Gen. Reg. No. L-16357 (April 22, 1963) ; Val-
leson, Inc. v. Tiburcio, Gen. Reg. No. L-18185 (Sept. 29, 1962) ; Donato v. PHIL-
MAROA, Gen. Reg. No. L-2506 (May 18, 1959).
669 Naguiat v. Arcilla, Gen. Reg. No. L-16602 (Feb. 28, 1963); Board of Liqui-
dators v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14366 (Oct. 31, 1962); Campos Rueda Corp. v.
Bautista, Gen. Reg. No. L-18453 (Sept. 19, 1962) ; Republic Say. Bank v. CIR, Gen.
Reg. No. L-16637 (June 30, 1961); Insular Sugar Ref. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No.
L-19247 (May 31, 1963); Magdalena Estate v. Bangilan, Gen. Reg. No. L-16357(April 22, 1963) ; Gracella v. El Colegio del Hospicio de San Jose, Gen. Reg. No.
L-15152 (Jan. 31, 1963).
670 Minimum Wage Law § 13. Morabe v. Brown, Gen. Reg. No. L-6018 (May 31,
1954); NARIC Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14999 (Dec. 30, 1961).
671 National Mines & Allied Workers v. Philippine Iron Mines, Gen. Reg. No.
L-19372 (Oct. 31, 1964); Lepanto Consol. Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, Gen.
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dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR; 72 (7) criminal
violations of the Industrial Peace Act; "1 (8) damages arising from
disputes beyond the jurisdiction of the CIR;. 7' (9) cases and proceed-
ings affecting non-industrial employment; 75 and (10) moral damages
arising from violations of labor laws. 6'
Powers of CIR. The CIR is endowed with two sets of powers: it has
the powers of the regular courts, including their inherent powers, and it
has the special powers of an administrative agency. The special powers
include rule-making powers, 77 investigatory powers,"'8 and adjudica-
tive powers."' These powers are exercised with considerable discretion
because of their scope as expressed by statute, and the essentiality of
the policies they were fashioned to promote. A further contributing
factor is the limited review of CIR decisions.
It has been held that the powers granted to the CIR under C.A. No.
103, although very broad, constitute a valid grant controlled by suffi-
cient standards, and hence do not infringe upon the principle of separa-
tion of powers, the prohibition against delegation of the legislative
function, and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.80
Under C.A. No. 103, the court is expressly given the power to (1)
adopt its own rules of procedures without regard to technicalities or
legal forms; 8 ' (2) to resort to mediation and conciliation, so as to
reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
Reg. No. L-15171 (April 29, 1963) ; Perez v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18182 (Feb. 27,
1963) ; Araullo v. Monte de Piedad, Gen. Reg. No. L-77840 (April 23, 1963).672 Cueto v. Ortiz, Gen. Reg. No. L-11555 (May 31, 1960); National Ass'n of Trade
Unions v. Bayona, Gen. Reg. No. L-12940 (April 17, 1959); Cebu Port Labor Union
v. State Marine Corp., Gen. Reg. No. L-9350 (May 20, 1957); Allied Free Workers v.
Apostol, Gen. Reg. No. L-8876 (Oct. 31, 1957); Cruz v. Cinema, Stage & Radio
Entertainment Free Workers, Gen. Reg. No. L-9581 (July 30, 1957); PAFLU v.
Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-9115 (Aug. 31, 1956); Reyes v. Tan, Gen. Reg. No. L-9137
(Aug. 31, 1956) ; PAFLU v. Barot, Gen. Reg. No. L-9281 (Sept. 28, 1956).
673 Scoty's Dep't Store v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-8116 (Aug. 25, 1956) ; Tolen-
tino v. Angeles, Gen. Reg. No. L-8150 (May 30, 1956) ; Hotel & Restaurant Free
Workers v. Kim San Cafe, Gen. Reg. No. L-8100 (Nov. 29, 1957).
874Abo v. PHILAME Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-19912 (Jan. 30, 1965) ;
Allied Free Workers Union v. Estipona, Gen. Reg. No. L-17934 (Dec. 28, 1961);
Cueto v. Ortiz, Gen. Reg. No. L-11555 (May 31, 1960).
875 See cases in notes 138-40 supra.
676Bugay v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa, Gen. Reg. No. L-13093 (Feb. 28,
1962).677 C.A. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
878 C.A. No. 103, § 12, para. 1 (1936), as amended, PHri. ANN. LAws tit 42, § 15
(1956).
79C.A. No. 103, § 6 & 20 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 9 & 23(1956).
68 DInternational Hardwood & Veneer Co. v. Pangil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602
(1940).
881 C.A. No. 103, § 20 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 23 (1956).
Also, Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16682 (July 26, 1963).
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settlement;.. 2 (3) to inspect any labor establishment or premises when
necessary to the performance of the duties of the court and to make
inquiries concerning the subject of inspection;... (4) to refer any dis-
pute or matter pending before the court to another agency or body
when deemed necessary;"' (5) to delegate its incidental and inherent
powers mentioned in section 6 of C.A. No. 103, with the exception of
the power to punish for contempt;6 5 (6) to give such relief as is neces-
sary or expedient for the purpose of settling or preventing industrial
disputes;.68 (7) to take subsequent action regarding its final awards;.68
(8) to interpret its own awards;.. and (9) in the exercise of its powers
of compulsory arbitration, to enjoin strikes as well as lockouts. 9
Due process. The CIR is subject to the limitations in the laws and
in the Constitution. Generally, such limitations are comprised in the
broad requirements of due process. The requirements60 which the
court must observe in its trials and proceedings include the duty to
accord a hearing, and to give each interested party an opportunity to
present his own case and to submit evidence in support thereof; to con-
sider the evidence presented; and to act on an independent considera-
tion of the law and facts of the controversy. Further, the court's find-
ings or conclusions must be supported by substantial evidence, and only
evidence presented at the hearing or contained in the record and dis-
closed to the parties may be considered. The court has an affirmative
duty to render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings are apprised of the various issues involved and the reasons
for the decisions rendered.
In addition to the constitutional requirements of procedural due
process, the constitutional limitations of substantive due process69' and
equal protection of the law" 2 have been held to apply to the CIR.
682 C.A. No. 103, § 4, para. 2 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 7
(1956).
683 C.A. No. 103, § 12, para. 1 (1936), as amended, Pn.. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 15 (1956).
684 C.A. No. 103, § 10 (1936), as amended, Pu. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 13 (1956).
685 C.A. No. 103, § 6 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 9 (1956).
68 C.A. No. 103, § 13 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 16 (1956).
687 C.A. No. 103, § 17 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 20 (1956).
688 C.A. No. 103, § 18 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 21 (1956).
685 C.A. No. 103, § 19 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 22 (1956);
R.A. No. 875, § 10 (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit 42, § 42 (1956).690 See Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1939).
691 Premiere Prods. v. Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No.
L-8048 (June 30, 1955); Caltex v. Philippine Labor Organization, Gen. Reg. No.
L-5206, (April 29, 1963); Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. Talisay-Silay Employees &
Laborers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-5406 (May 29, 1953) ; J. P. Heilbronn Co. v. NLU,
Gen. Reg. No. L-6454 (Nov. 29, 1954) ; Sunripe Coconuts Prods. Co. v. CIR, 83 Phil.
520 (1949).
692 Sunripe Coconut Prods. Co. v. CIR, 83 Phil. 520 (1949).
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Flexibility of procedures. The CIR enjoys considerable lattitude in
effectuating the purposes of statutes on labor relations. As a rule, it
exercises broad discretion in the choice of techniques for settling dis-
putes.93 and for fact finding,"' in regulating the conduct of its hearings
and other proceedings, "5 in receiving and evaluating the evidence, 99
and in fashioning the remedy appropriate to the case. " '
In the ascertainment of facts involving a dispute pending before it,
the CIR may resort to trials, 98 inspection and ex parte inquiry,6
referral to experts, 0 and the usual methods of discovery."'
Under existing law, the examiner system permits a hearing officer or
examiner of the CIR to conduct the trial of cases assigned to him by
the judge in charge, and thereafter to submit a report on the facts, with
recommendations, to the judge. 02 This system is recognized in the law
establishing the CIR,70 s and in the Industrial Peace Act."0'
In the conduct of a trial, examiners, by delegation and as authorized
under C.A. No. 103/05 exercise the power to administer oaths, summon
the parties, issue subpoenas and to require the attendance and testi-
mony of witnesses, the production of pertinent books, papers, records,
documents and other things material to the controversy." Other pow-
ers exercised by examiners in conducting a hearing, as a matter of
administrative practice, include the power to rule upon offers of proof
and receive relevant evidence; to take or cause to be taken depositions
whenever the ends of justice would be subserved thereby; to regulate
the course of the hearing, to the end that the record will fully reveal
the facts necessary to a proper decision, and at the same time to keep
the record concise; to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence into the record; to hold conferences for the settle-
093 C.A. No. 103, § 13 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 16 (1959);
Dee Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-2216 (Jan. 31, 1950).
694 C.A. No. 103, §§ 6, 7, 10 & 12 (1936) as amended PHxL. ANN. LAWS it. 42,
§§ 9, 10,13 & 15 (1956).
695 C.A. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
696 C. No. 103, § 20 (1936), as amended, pRam. ANN. LAvs tit. 42, § 23 (1956).
97 CA. No. 103, § 19 (1936), as amended, PHI. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 22 (1956).
698 CA. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANNr. LAWS tit 42, § 10 (1956).
699C.A No. 103, § 12 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 15 (1956).
700 C.A. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
701 C.A. No. 103, § 6, para. 1 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAws tit 42 § 9
(1956).
702 Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union, 70 Phil. 539 (1940),
71 Phil. 124 (1941).
708 CA. No. 103, § 6, par. 1 (1936), as amended, PHI. ANN. LAWS tit 42, § 9
(1956).
704 R.A. No. 875, § 5 (b) (1953), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 5 (b)
(1956).
705 C.A. No. 103, § 6 (1936), as amended, Pmi. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 9 (1956).
708 CA No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
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ment or simplification of issues; to dispose of procedural requests and
similar matters; to rule on incidental matters presented in the course
of the hearing.' °7
CIR hearings. A trial-type CIR hearing, whether before an exam-
iner or a judge of the court, resembles a trial in court, except that the
exclusionary rules of evidence are relaxed and the atmosphere is less
formal. The trial is held in the usual place assigned to the trial court,
unless convenience of the parties requires that the trial be held in
another place." 8 The CIR has considerable discretion in determining
whether the hearing is to be public or private. As a rule, however, the
hearings are public."' The trial is held at the time fixed in the notice
to the parties. 10 The CIR is empowered to conduct an ex parte hear-
ing, provided that the absent party has been given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to be present. 1 ' An ex parte hearing may also follow the denial
of an application for a continuance, or the declaration that a party is
in default.712
Hearing methods and the conduct of the proceedings in a trial are
largely within the control of the presiding officer, whether judge or trial
examiner. The law confers broad authority in this regard. The trier of
fact is empowered to direct parties to be joined or stricken from the
proceedings; to correct, amend or waive any error, defect or irregu-
larity, whether in substance or in form; to extend prescribed time; to
give all directions deemed necessary or expedient in the determination
of the dispute; and where any matter is trivial, or where further pro-
ceedings by the court are not necessary or desirable, to dismiss or re-
frain from hearing further or determining the dispute or part thereof."'3
The procedures observed by the regular courts in the conduct of ordi-
nary trials are normally followed. Departures from these procedures,
however, are sanctioned, as the CIR is directed to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms."71
Evaluation of evidence. The question of sufficiency of the evidence
707 Information gathered from interview with the Clerk of Court and Presiding
Judge of the CIR.08 National Fed'n of Sugar-cane Planters v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15423 (June
22, 1962).
709 C.A. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
710 Ibid.
711 Ibid.
712 E.g., Selma v. Plaslu, Gen. Reg. No. L-9884 (Dec. 28, 1957).
713 C.A. No. 103, § 7 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 10 (1956).
71C.A. No. 103, § 20 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 23 (1956).
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is primarily for the CIR. Its determinations are usually not disturbed,
provided that the evidence in question is substantial." 5
The issue of credibility is also primarily for the CIR. Unless a clear
abuse of discretion is shown, its determinations are respected. 1 ' In a
case in which there was conflicting testimony as to whether or not a
dismissed security guard had been caught sleeping, the CIR was up-
held in sustaining employee's version, where the record showed no
clear abuse of discretion in assigning credence to his story."17 But
where disinterested witnesses contradicted the testimony of a com-
plaining employee, the CIR has been reversed in giving credence to his
testimony, on the basis that disinterested witnesses are more credible
since the self-interest of the employee colors his testimony.718
What weight should be assigned to a particular piece of evidence is
also primarily for the CIR. The rule is that "findings on the weight of
evidence by the court of industrial relations are conclusive.""1 9
CIR awards. The CIR enjoys broad discretion in the choice of spe-
cific forms of relief.7 20 However, the authority of the CIR to award
specific forms of relief not claimed or demanded, is confined to such
matters as are incidentally or impliedly litigated, in the sense that they
are necessary or expedient in settling the dispute or preventing further
disputes. 21 Settlements or compromises effected through the interven-
tion of the CIR and approved by it are deemed to be and have the same
effect as decisions or awards. 22 Awards based on amicable settlements
or compromise are not abrogated by mere notice to the CIR as pro-
vided for in section 17 of C.A. No. 103.723 These awards may be termi-
nated only with the assent of the parties, or for sufficient cause duly
found by the CIR after due notice hearing of interested parties."
Awards of the CIR become final when the time to appeal to the
715 Santiago Rice Mill v. Santiago Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-18040 (Aug. 31,
1962).
718 National Fastener Corp. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15834 (Jan. 20, 1961) ; Luzon
Marine Dep't v. Pineda, Gen. Reg. No. L-8681 (May 25, 1936).
717 Permanent Concrete Prods. v. Frivaldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-14179 (Sept. 15, 1960).
7 1 8 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No.
L-15826 (Jan. 23, 1961).
710 Union of PECO Employees (NLU) v. PECO, Gen. Reg. No. L-4423 (March
21, 1952), cited in Ormoc Sugar Co. v. OSCO Workers Fraternity Labor Union, Gen.
Reg. No. L-15826 (Jan. 23, 1961).
720 C.A. No. 103, § 13 (1936), as amended, PHIm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 16 (1956).
721 Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13364 (July 26, 1960) ; H. E. Heacock
Co. v. NLU, Gen. Reg. No. L-11135 (April 30, 1958); Donato v. PHILMAROA, Gen.
Reg. No. L-12506 (May 18, 1959).
722 C.A. No. 103, § 2, para. 4 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 7
(1936).7 23 Katipunan Labor Union v. Caltex, Gen. Reg. No. L-10337 (May 27, 1957).
724,Ibid.
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Supreme Court has lapsed and no appeal has been perfected,72 or
when the award is affirmed by the Supreme Court.726 Once the award
is final, it cannot be re-opened or reconsidered on grounds which
have been directly or impliedly litigated.2 The decision of a trial
judge assumes finality as a CIR decision, when a motion for its
reconsideration before the CIR en banc is denied for lack of written
arguments as required by the CIR rules,7 8 or on some other valid
ground,7 29 and no appeal is taken therefrom.2 "
If a period of time is specified in an award it is effective for that
period. 2" If no period is specified, the award subsists for a minimum
of three years."' At the end of the three-year period, the award
subsists until terminated by an express order of the court, or on
motion by any party to the case and for good cause shown. '
In proceedings to terminate an existing award there must be a
formal motion filed with the court seeking the termination for good
reason or on just grounds. Due notice of the motion must be given
and there must be a hearing at which all interested parties are given
an opportunity to be present and heard. In addition, the order of
the court terminating the award must comply with the requisites of
due process.3 4
According to C.A. No. 103, at any time during the effectiveness
of an award it is subject to modification.3 ' Any petition for re-opening
or modification, however, must be sought on grounds not already
in existence or otherwise available before the award in question
acquired finality in the CIR.38 The most frequent modification of
725 Psisi. R. CT. 39, § 1.
726 C.A. No. 103, § 15, para. 1 (1936), as amended, PHIm. ANN. LAWS fit. 42, § 18
(1956).
727 See cases cited note 721 supra. Finality may result from (1) failure to appeal,
e.g., Manila Hotel Co. v. Manila Hotel Employees Ass'n, Gen. Reg. No. L-9190; (2)
from defective appeal, e.g. Broce v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959) or
(3) from dismissal of the appeal on the merits, e.g., Local 7, Press & Printing Free
Workers v. Tabigne, Gen. Reg. No. L-16093 (Nov. 29, 1960).
728 Galvez v. Philippine Long Distance Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-16370 (Oct. 31, 1961).
729 San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962).
730 Ibid.
731 C.A. No. 103, § 17 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 20 (1956).
732 Ibid.
733 Caltex v. Katipunan Labor Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-13918 (April 25, 1962);
Philippine Sugar Institute v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-13464 (May 25, 1960) ; National
Dev. Co. v. Aralar, Gen. Reg. No. L-14258 (July 26, 1960); NAWASA v. CIR, Gen.
Reg. No. L-13161 (Feb. 25, 1960) ; Katipunan Labor Union v. Caltex, Gen. Reg. No.
L-10337 (May 27, 1957).
734 Ibid.
735 C.A. No. 103, § 17 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 20 (1956).
736 San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18270 (Nov. 28, 1962). Also
cases in note 721 supra.
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an award consists in the extension of the benefits granted to persons
not originally parties to the case in which the award was rendered.""
Execution and enforcement. Awards of the CIR are immediately
executory, whether appealed or not. 3 ' Nevertheless, "for special
reasons, the Court [may] ... order that execution be stayed," subject
to specified conditions.3 9
CIR awards are executed in the same manner as the judgments
of regular courts.70  Thus, the proceedings authorized by the provi-
sions of the rules of court on execution of judgments are available to
enforce CIR awards, including levy on execution upon real estate,
garnishment, examination of judgment debtor, and proceedings against
third party debtors of the judgment debtor.74  The CIR has the power
to execute the decision and awards rendered in the principal case,
and also its orders issued in the exercise of its incidental jurisdiction,
such as those expressly provided for in section 19 C.A. No. 103. 71
Execution may be by simple motion in the CIR, and when sought
for the first time it may be granted at any time within five years
from the time of entry of the award or order.7 3 When the award
has been previously executed, execution may be allowed at any time
within five years from the date of the last order of execution.7"
Execution may be enforced by an independent action or petition,
after the lapse of five years and before the lapse of ten years from
the date of entry or the date of the last enforcement.7"'
The motion or petition to enforce must be filed with the CIR and
737NAWASA v. NAWASA Consol. Unions, Gen. Reg. No. 1-18938 (Aug. 31,
1964); Manila Hotel v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18873 (Sept. 30, 1963); NAMARCO
& PRISCO (Board of Liquidators) v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17804 (Jan. 31, 1963) ;
NASSCO v. Artez, Gen. Reg. No. L-17349 (April 23, 1962); PRISCO v. CIR,
Gen. Reg. No. L-14613 (Nov. 30, 1962); National Dev. Co. v. Aralar, Gen. Reg. No.
L-14258 (July 26, 1960) ; PRISCO v. PRISCO Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-9288(Dec. 29, 1958) ; PRISCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-9797 & L-9834 (Nov. 29, 1957) ;
Detective & Protective Bureau v. Guevarra, Gen. Reg. No. L-8738 (May 31, 1957);
LASEDECO v. Caledonia Pile Workers Union, Gen. Reg. No. -4877 (Feb. 26, 1952) ;
Leyte Land Transp. Co. v. Leyte Farmers & Laborers Union, Gen. Reg. No. L-1377
(May 12, 1948).
738 C.A. No. 103, § 15, para. 1 (1936), as amended, PHL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 18(1956). Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. Nos. L-14023 & L-14135 (Jan.
30, 1960).
73)CA No. 103, § 14 (1936), as amended, PHn.. ANN. LAWS, tit 42, § 17 (1956).
740 Talisay-Silay Milling Co. v. dIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17344 (April 23, 1962).
741 PHe Ra. R. CT. 39.
742 E~. YU Ki Lam v. Micaller, Gen. Reg. No. L-9506 (Sept. 14, 1956).
743 National Dev. Co. v. Aralar, Gen. Reg. No. L-14258 (July 26, 1960). Also
NARIC v. Henson, Gen. Reg. No. L-15093 (July 30, 1960); MRR v. dIR, Gen. Reg.
No. L-18389 (Jan. 31, 1963).
744 NAMARCO & PRISCO v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18389 (Jan. 31, 1963). Also
see cases cited in note 743 supra.
745 Ibid.
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not with the regular courts, as the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR
extends to the enforcement of its awards. It has been held that in
the enforcement of its orders and judgments, the CIR is not subject
to the control of the courts of first instance.746
In exceptional circumstances, a CIR judgment is not stale for the
purpose of execution by mere motion. The rule is that where pro-
ceedings on execution have been suspended or deferred on the request
of the judgment debtor, there is a waiver of the right to set up the
five-year limitation on the enforcement of judgments by mere motion,
and the judgment may be executed on mere motion notwithstanding
the lapse of more than five years from the time it became final and
executory.747 It has been held that a motion for an alias writ of
execution was timely where the judgment had been the object of
various periodical executions, each within five years from the date
of entry of the judgment. These judgments were not enforced because
of the poor financial condition of the company and because of an
agreement of the parties which had been approved by the CIR. 48
While institution of an appeal does not generally stay the execu-
tion of CIR awards, it may if there is an express order of the CIR
providing for a stay, or if a stay is ordered for special reasons stated
in the order. The court, in addition, may require a deposit, or the
filing of a bond. 49
Administrative appeal. Before the decision, order, or award of a
trial judge can be questioned in the Supreme Court, there must be
a resort to internal review, as prescribed by law.75 As previously dis-
cussed, this is done with a motion for reconsideration before the CIR
en banc.7"'
For a motion for reconsideration to be deemed duly filed with the
CIR, the requisites prescribed by the CIR rules of procedure must
be substantially complied with. The CIR may on its own initiative re-
fuse to deal with the motion for reconsideration and summarily dismiss
or deny the same, if the motion is pro forma.75'1 A motion may be
deemed pro forma if not supported by written arguments as required
74 6 Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana v. Caluag, Gen. Reg. No.
L-17692 (July 20, 1961).
747 MRR v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-18389 (Jan. 31, 1963).
748 Ibid.
749 C.A. No. 103, § 14 (1936), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 17 (1956).7 5 0 Brae v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959) ; Nicolas v. Castillo, Gen.
Reg. No. L-8129 (July 25, 1955).
751C.A. No. 103, § 1 (1936), as amended, PHiL. ANN. LAWS tit. 42, § 4 (1956).
752 United Employees Welfare Ass'n v. Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys, Gen. Reg. No.
L-9835 (Sept. 26, 1957).
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by the CIR rules. It is the CIR practice to require the submission of
written arguments, if not attached or incorporated in the motion itself,
within ten days from the date of filing."' Refusal to reconsider may
be based on late filing.3 4 Where a motion is clearly out of time, its
dismissal or denial may be inferred from the fact that the CIR did
not deal with it, as shown by the silence of the record as to its denial
or approval."" If the motion was not served on the adverse party
as required by CIR rules, the CIR may dismiss or deny the action.7 15
The effect of summary dismissal or denial is that no CIR decision
exists which can be appealed to the Supreme Court; hence, the
decision of the trial court stands as the final decision of the CIR.757
It is as though no reconsideration had ever been sought; accordingly,
a resort to the Supreme Court would be futile, in view of the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Setting of the motion for oral argument is within the discretion of
the CIR en banc. Unless deemed necessary by the CIR and required
by its order directing the hearing of the motion on oral argument,
oral arguments on the motion are deemed dispensed with. The pre-
sumption is that the moving party must have set forth all arguments
in his written motion as required by the CIR rules, thus obviating
any necessity for oral arguments.7 18
Upon a motion for consideration duly filed and supported with
arguments as required by the CIR rule, the CIR en banc acquires
full authority over the ruling or decision appealed to it and may affirm,
reverse, set aside or modify the decision as the facts and the law
warrant. The CIR is not bound by the findings of the trial court
but may set them aside if they are not supported by the evidence.759
75S Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers v. Tabigne, Gen. Reg. No. L-16093
(Nov. 29, 1960); Pangasinan Employees, Laborers & Tenants Ass'n v. Martinez, Gen.
Reg. No. L-13846 (May 20, 1960); Cebu Portland Cement v. Savellano, Gen. Reg.
No. L-10781 (May 29, 1959).
754 UP v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15416 (April 28, 1960) ; Pangasinan Employees,
Laborers & Tenants Ass'n v. Martinez, Gen. Reg. No. L-13846 (May 20, 1960) ; Bien
v. Castillo, Gen. Reg. No. L-7428 (May 24, 1955).75SPangasinan Employees, Laborers & Tenants Ass'n v. Martinez, Gen. Reg. No.
L-13846 (May 20, 1960).756 NDC v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15422 (Nov, 30, 1962); Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa sa MRR v. Bugay, Gen. Reg. No. L-9327 (March 30, 1957).7 57 Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16682 (July 26, 1963) ; NDC
v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-15422 (Nov. 3, 1962) ; Bien v. Castillo, Gen. Reg. No. L-7428
(May 24, 1955) ; and Broce v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-12367 (Oct. 28, 1959).
758 Permanent Concrete Prods. v. Frivaldo, Gen. Reg. No. L-14179 (Sept. 15,
1959); Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Savellano, Gen. Reg. No. L-10781 (May 29,
1959) ; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil. 124 (1941).
U13 PLASLU v. Kin San Rice & Corn Mill Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-18235 (Oct. 30,
1962).
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It is settled that the CIR has full authority to grant a new trial
in appropriate cases. This authority is an inherent power of the CIR
as a court of justice."'0
Review of CIR decisions. Determinations and orders of the CIR
are subject to limited judicial review. As a rule, its decisions and
orders may be reviewed through an appeal by writ of certiorari."'
Occasionally, their validity may be tested through special civil actions,
usually through independent certiorari suits." 2
In order for an appeal to be deemed to have been duly made,
the following requisites must be met: the order, decision, or award
appealed from must be an order, decision, or award of the CIR en
banc;763 the order, decision, or award must be final, not interloc-
utory; 64 and an appeal must be perfected within ten days of notice
of the order, decision, or award. 65
As prescribed by the revised rules of court, the grounds on which
a petition for certiorari may be given recognition are that the CIR
has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by
the Supreme Court; or that it has decided it in a way not in accord
with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. 66
Under C.A. No. 103, as amended, the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court appears to be restricted to "any case involving a
question of law." 6 ' And in the case of unfair labor practice cases,
the Industrial Peace Act is explicit that "the appeal to the Supreme
Court shall be limited to questions of law only.7 68  Nevertheless,
questions of fact have been reviewed by the Supreme Court, not on
the basis of statutory authority, but on the basis that due process
requires that the findings of the CIR be supported by stubstantial
evidence. 69
760 PLASLU v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., Gen. Reg. No. L-7296 (April 30,
1955); San Miguel Brewery v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-4634 (April 28, 1952);
PASUMIL Workers Union v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-46835 (Jan. 20, 1940).
761 C.A. No. 103, § 14 (1936), as amended, PHuL. ANN. LAws tit. 42, § 17 (1956).
7 62 Chuan v. Nahag, Gen. Reg. No. L-7201 & Nahag v. Chuan, Gen. Reg. No.
L-7211 (Sept. 22, 1954).
763 See cases cited in note 750 supra.
764 PLASLU v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-14656 (Nov. 29, 1960) ; PLDT Employees
v. PLDT, Gen. Reg. No. L-8138 (Aug. 20, 1955).
765 Puin. R CT. 43, §§ 1, 4.
766 Pam.. R. CT. 43, § 3.
767 C.A. No. 103, § 15 (1936), as amended, PHIL. ANN. LAWs tit. 42, § 18 (1956).
768 R.A. No. 875, § 6 (1953), as amended, PHm. ANN. LAws fit. 42, § 38 (1956).
769 Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1939). Among the latest cases applying this
standard are Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-16682 (July 26, 1963) ;
Sanchez v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-19000 (July 31, 1963); Manila Metal Caps & Tin
Cans Mfg. Co. v. CIR, Gen. Reg. No. L-17578 (July 31, 1963).
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